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(영문) 서울동부지방법원 2017.07.06 2016가단101687

소유권이전등기

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1. Each point is indicated in the attached drawing (5), (6), (7), (8), and (5) among the area of 21.2 square meters in Seongdong-gu Seoul, Seongdong-gu.

Reasons

1. Facts of recognition;

A. Seongdong-gu Seoul: (a) ownership of Seongdong-gu was owned by Defendant Republic of Korea; (b) ownership transfer registration was made under Defendant B on October 14, 1958; (c) ownership transfer registration was made on October 14, 1958; (d) ownership transfer registration was made under Defendant D on October 8, 1984 with respect to shares of 103.67/150 on October 8, 1984; and (e) ownership transfer registration was made under Defendant C’s name on April 33/150 on September 27, 1987.

B. Seongdong-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government is the land adjacent to the above E land. G owned the said F land and its ground building (hereinafter “instant housing”). From November 4, 1992, H sold the said land and the instant housing to H on May 24, 2006. H sold the said land and the instant housing to the Plaintiff on September 1, 2015, and the Plaintiff completed the registration of ownership transfer on the said land on October 30, 2015.

C. The instant housing had existed before November 4, 1992, but part of the instant land was used as the housing site.

[Ground for Recognition: Facts without dispute; Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 4; Gap evidence No. 6; Eul evidence Nos. 1 and 3 (including paper numbers); each fact inquiry results against Seongdong-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government Office of this Court; the result of the appraiser I's survey and appraisal, the purport of the whole pleadings]

2. Determination as to the principal lawsuit

A. (1) The determination on the cause of the claim (i) If the registrant continues to be the same during the period of prescriptive acquisition, it is sufficient to determine where the period has elapsed by deeming the starting point from where the starting point of the prescriptive acquisition between the registration titleholders, and only the fact that the period has elapsed. As such, even in a case where the total period of the possession period of the former possessor by succeeding the possession of the former possessor has elapsed 20 years, the time of voluntary commencement after the former

(2) According to the above legal principles, the Plaintiff was the owner of the instant house, G, H, and current owner, according to the above facts of recognition. (3) The Plaintiff was the owner of the instant house.