In addition, both the respondent for attachment order and the prosecutor's appeal are dismissed.

A. The lower court’s sentencing (25 years of imprisonment with labor) is unreasonable as the Defendant and the requester for the attachment order (unfair sentencing) are excessively unreasonable.

B. The lower court’s sentencing (unfair sentencing) is unreasonable as it is too unhued.

2. The determination of the reasons for appeal is based on the statutory penalty, based on the discretionary determination that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing as prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act, and there is a unique area of the first deliberation in our criminal litigation law that takes the trial-oriented principle and the principle of directness.

In addition, in light of these circumstances and the ex post facto in-depth nature of the appellate court, it is reasonable to respect the sentencing in the event that there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance does not deviate from the reasonable scope of the discretion. Although the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of the discretion, it is desirable to refrain from rendering a sentence that does not differ from the appellate court’s view (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015) by destroying the first instance judgment and rendering a sentence that does not vary from the first instance judgment (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). The lower court sentenced the above sentence to the Defendant and the applicant for an attachment order (hereinafter “Defendant”), on account of the sentencing as stated in its reasoning, the Defendants did not have any previous conviction exceeding the fine, and the Defendants had the burden of the victim’s living expenses and economic suffering, etc. are determined in full consideration of the punishment already asserted in the lower judgment.

The Defendants asserted that the Defendants committed the instant crime only by contingency and did not commit the instant crime in a planned manner. However, in full view of the various circumstances stated by the lower court, it is sufficiently recognized that the Defendants murdered the victim D for the purpose of receiving the death insurance proceeds.