2. It is desirable to refrain from rendering a sentence that does not change the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and where the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect them. Although the sentence of the first instance court falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to refrain from rendering a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court by destroying the first instance judgment solely on the ground that the difference between the opinion of the appellate court and the opinion of the appellate court (Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). In light of the foregoing legal principles, considering the following: (a) there is no change in the conditions of sentencing between the lower court and the first instance court because new data on sentencing were not submitted; (b) there is no change in the conditions of sentencing; and (c) it is deemed that the victim, who is a juvenile, committed an indecent act, committed an indecent act, and thus, it cannot be deemed that the lower court’s sentence that sentenced the suspension of execution three years, is too unreasonable to escape from the reasonable scope of discretion.

3. In conclusion, the defendant's appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act on the grounds that the defendant's appeal is without merit.