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(영문) 대구지방법원 2011.12.23. 선고 2011구합2325 판결

직업능력개발훈련비용지원금환수및지급제한처분취소

Cases

2011Gu 2325 Vocational skill development training expenses, refund fees and restrictions on payment

Revocation

Plaintiff

A Stock Company

Defendant

Head of the Daegu Regional Employment and Labor Office Port Office

Conclusion of Pleadings

November 23, 2011

Imposition of Judgment

December 23, 2011

Text

1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Purport of claim

The Defendant’s order to restrict the payment of subsidies and order to return KRW 23,729,950 (including additional collection money) for one year (from August 12, 2008 to August 11, 2009) against the Plaintiff on May 24, 2011 is revoked.

Reasons

1. Details of the disposition;

A. The Plaintiff entered into an entrustment contract for workplace skill development training with the non-party B school (hereinafter referred to as the "non-party B school"), and conducted the process of improving the on-site activities and promoting the organization for 104 employees belonging to the Plaintiff for 2 days from June 13, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the "instant training course").

B. On July 31, 2008, the Plaintiff applied for expenses for workplace skill development training with the Defendant on behalf of the Plaintiff, and received subsidies of KRW 51,290 on August 29, 2008. The aforementioned training expenses included KRW 51,290 for Nonparty C, who caused the Plaintiff’s work. On May 24, 2011, the Defendant treated the Plaintiff as having been unable to participate in the instant training course due to a holiday leave, and was paid training expenses by fraud or other improper means (amended by Act No. 9315, Dec. 31, 2008; hereinafter referred to as the “former Employment Insurance Act”); Article 35(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 21015, Sep. 18, 2008; hereinafter referred to as the “former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act”) and Article 208(1)5(2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 21065, Mar. 16, 2015(hereinafter referred to “former Act”).

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1, Eul evidence 1-1-3, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The plaintiff's assertion is as follows.

A. Since the Plaintiff fully entrusted the instant training course to the instant university, the Plaintiff is not responsible for the erroneous management of attendance at the entrusted training institution, and it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff could have known if he/she knew of, or paid considerable attention to, such circumstances. Therefore, the Plaintiff did not receive “a false or other unlawful means” and the instant disposition did not exist.

B. In interpreting the provision of the Enforcement Decree of this case to order the return of all subsidies paid during the period of restriction on payment, regardless of whether the provision was provided by false or other unlawful means, the order to return subsidies, which is based on the provision of the Enforcement Decree of this case, is also unlawful, since the Plaintiff’s property right is excessively infringed and invalidated in violation of the Constitution.

3. Related statutes;

Attachment 'Related Acts and subordinate statutes' shall be as shown.

4. Facts of recognition;

A. The Plaintiff included C as a person subject to education while formulating the instant training course plan, and Nonparty D did not include Nonparty D.

B. C, included in the list of trainees of the instant training course, was married on June 8, 2008 and applied for a holiday leave from June 8, 2008 to June 14, 2008, and was not present at the instant training course for two days from June 13, 2008, and D, which was decided to be absent from the instant training course, attended the instant training course instead of the instant training course, and entered in the name column of C in the name column of C during the attendance of the instant training course. The Nonparty university issued the certificate of completion to the Plaintiff after implementing the instant training course, and the Plaintiff did not indicate that C completed the instant training course, but did not have any error in the certificate of completion (No. 6-3).

[Reasons for Recognition] Uncontentious Facts, Gap evidence 6-3, Eul evidence 3, Eul evidence 3, witness D's partial statements, the purport of whole pleadings

5. Determination

A. Judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion No. 2. A

(1) Sanction against violation of administrative regulations is a sanction against the objective fact that is a violation of administrative regulations to achieve administrative purposes, and thus, barring any special circumstance, such as where a failure to perform his/her duties is not caused by an intentional act or negligence, it may be imposed even on the violator (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 98Du5972, May 26, 2000; 2002Du5177, Sept. 2, 2003; 2002Du5177, Sept. 2, 2003). "False or other unlawful means" refers to any unlawful act conducted by an unqualified business owner in order to conceal the eligibility to receive payment or to decrease the eligibility to receive payment of incentives for promotion of new employment (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 200Du4272, Jun. 11, 2009; 200Du727, Feb. 7, 2005).

(2) In light of the following circumstances, it is reasonable to view that C was aware of the fact that it was not present in the instant training course, i.e., (i) it was written differently as if C had participated in the instant training course, and (ii) it is necessary to accurately confirm the attendance since the subsidies for training expenses were paid depending on whether C had participated in the training course; and (iii) it was due to the use of the ordinary leave that C was unable to participate in the instant training course, and thus, it is reasonable to view that C was well aware of the fact that the Plaintiff was not present in the instant training course, and that it was

In light of the fact that the Plaintiff was at fault on behalf of the Plaintiff, and even if the Plaintiff applied for subsidies on behalf of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff was able to verify whether C was actually present and received training by obtaining the completion certificate from the participants of the training course from the Nonparty University and was given the opportunity for correction. Thus, the Plaintiff’s claim for training expenses against C which the Plaintiff did not participate in the training course of this case is based on “the act of false or other unlawful means.” Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit.

B. Judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion No. 2.B.

(1) The instant provision provides that a person who received, or intended to receive, incentives, etc. by fraud or other improper means shall not pay any kind of incentives, etc., regardless of whether the person received, or intended to receive, the incentives, etc., by fraud or other improper means, for one year from the date on which he/she received, or intended to receive, the incentives, etc., and, if paid in error, requires the return thereof by ordering the return thereof to achieve the purpose of sanction against the unjust recipient of the incentives, etc. and for preventing the future payments (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Du6476, Aug. 20, 2009)

(2) The instant provision is justifiable as above, and its purpose was limited to one year, not a long-term period of restriction on payment, in a way to achieve its purpose, and thus, the infringement of property rights was limited to a minimum. The necessity of public interest to strictly control and manage the payment of subsidies for the establishment of employment insurance finance and for the efficient and transparent operation of the support system is greater than the private interest infringed upon by the restriction on payment of subsidies. If there was a prior disposition to restrict payment after finding out the fact that the payment was received through false or other unlawful means, the subsidy was not paid for one year from the restriction period, and if there was a prior disposition to restrict payment, it was not paid for the restriction period of payment. In light of the fact that the above fact was discovered later, limiting the scope of return of the subsidy not only the entire subsidy paid for one year from the restriction period but also its part is more favorable, and thus, it cannot be deemed that the instant provision violates the principle of excessive prohibition. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit.

6. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges

The presiding judge, judge and judicial police officer

Judges Civil Service Bureau

Judges Kim Yong-nam

Attached Form

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.