1. Judgment on the violation of the principle of retroactive prohibition of legislation

The applicant asserts that Article 2(1) of the Addenda of the former Act on the Structural Improvement of Agricultural Cooperatives (amended by Act No. 12413, Mar. 11, 2014; hereinafter referred to as the “Agricultural Cooperatives Structural Improvement Act”) requires the transfer of reserves of accounts in the mutual aid sector to the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation calculated on the basis of the preceding two years prior to March 11, 2014, which was the enforcement date thereof, is contrary to Article 13(2) of the Constitution, which is the deprivation of property rights by retroactive legislation.

The enforcement of the former Agricultural Cooperatives Act (amended by Act No. 10522, Mar. 31, 2011; effective from March 2, 2012) was abolished, and the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation was obligated to pay claims, such as deposits, in cases where the applicant’s mutual aid sector was abolished and the failure of the applicant and unit unions occurred. Nevertheless, Article 2(1) of the Addenda to the Act on the Structural Improvement of Agricultural Cooperatives is established to transfer the reserves of the account in the mutual aid sector that still remains in the applicant to the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation. Accordingly, this provision regulates the legal relationship that has not yet been completed with respect to the abolition of the mutual aid sector and the transfer of the depositor protection affairs. Therefore, it cannot be deemed that this prohibition is retroactive legislation.

Furthermore, according to the delegation under Articles 2(1) and 2(2) of the Addenda to the Structural Improvement of Agricultural Cooperatives, the provisions of the “Standards for Transfer of Reserve Funds to Mutual Financial Depositors Protection Fund Account in the sector of mutual financing projects” prescribed by the Minister of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, as alleged by the applicant, shall not be required to transfer the reserve as it is on March 2, 2012 without reflecting all the circumstances after March 2, 2012, as alleged by the applicant, and the amount of reserve finally subject to transfer is determined from the reserve calculated on the basis of the preceding day of March 2, 2012 through appraisal of assets and liabilities and confirmation of rights and obligations. Therefore, the prior applicant’s assertion on the unconstitutionality of a different premise is without merit.

2. Determination on violations of the principle of clarity

An applicant is unreasonable to interpret the meaning of “a thing accumulated” under Article 2(1) of the Addenda to the Act on the Structural Improvement of Agricultural Cooperatives as “a matter to be accumulated.” This court’s interpretation is derived from the failure to clearly define the meaning of “a thing accumulated” under Article 2(1) of the Addenda to the Act on the Structural Improvement of Agricultural Cooperatives. Therefore, Article 2(1) of the Addenda to the Act on the Structural Improvement of Agricultural Cooperatives goes against the

However, the subject of the court's request for adjudication on the constitutionality of a law under Article 41 (1) of the Constitutional Court Act is merely unconstitutional, and it cannot be said that the interpretation of a law provision is unconstitutional. The applicant's above assertion is merely disputing the court's interpretation of Article 2 (1) of the Addenda to the Act on the Structural Improvement of Agricultural Cooperatives, and it does not dispute the unconstitutionality of Article 2 (1) of the Addenda to the Act on the Structural Improvement of Agricultural Cooperatives. Thus, it cannot be a ground for filing an application for

3. Determination as to the violation of the excessive prohibition principle

The Claimant asserts that Article 2(1) of the Addenda to the Act on the Structural Improvement of Agricultural Cooperatives requires the transfer of reserves to “influence without clear standards” goes against the principle of excessive prohibition, thereby infringing on the applicant’s property rights. However, such assertion is merely a repeated assertion on the violation of the principle of retroactive prohibition of legislation and the principle of clarity, and it is difficult to view it as a assertion on the grounds for infringement of new fundamental rights.

4. Conclusion

It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench that the motion for adjudication on the constitutionality of the case is dismissed.

Justices Lee Dong-won (Presiding Justice)