2. In a case where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the judgment of the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect it.

(see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). In light of the fact that: (a) although the Defendant had already been punished twice due to drunk driving, personal injury was caused while driving the instant motor vehicle; and (b) the Defendant’s blood alcohol concentration level was considerably high at the time, the Defendant’s liability for the crime is not weak.

However, while the defendant did not find the damaged vehicle that was moving to a vehicle in the process of parking, it caused the instant traffic accident, the victim's degree of injury is relatively minor, and the damage is recovered through the comprehensive motor vehicle insurance that the defendant's vehicle was subscribed.

On the other hand, the above circumstances asserted by the prosecutor as an element of sentencing have already been discovered in the proceedings of the court below and sufficiently considered, and there is no particular change in the situation that is the condition of sentencing after the court below was sentenced.

Considering such circumstances and other factors as the Defendant’s age, character and conduct, environment, motive, appearance, and circumstances after the commission of the crime, the lower court’s sentencing was conducted within the reasonable scope of discretion, and cannot be deemed as being too unreasonable.

Therefore, prosecutor's assertion is without merit.

3. In conclusion, the prosecutor's appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.