However, it is reasonable to view that there was a dispute between the complainant C and the defendant as a matter of the written opinion on the renewal of the apartment management company and the replacement of the director of the management office and the written consent on the above written opinion, and that the complainant was signed by 15 residents in the written consent prior to the instant case. The defendant merely received the written withdrawal of consent from 7 residents only from the 15 residents prior to the instant written consent, and even though he merely received the written withdrawal of consent, he did not go through a sufficient investigation about the contents of his statement, such as “slickly, slickly, slickly,” and in light of the degree and contents of the expression when the defendant speaks as stated in the instant facts charged, it is reasonable to view that the defendant stated false facts with the intent to impair the reputation of the complainant as described in the instant facts charged, and that he was aware that it was false.

Nevertheless, the lower judgment that acquitted the Defendant of the facts charged of this case erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on determining the intention of defamation, etc.

2. In full view of the circumstances acknowledged by the evidence duly admitted and investigated, the lower court determined that the Defendant was not guilty on the ground that there is no evidence to acknowledge that the Defendant had made a false statement as stated in the facts charged of the instant case or that there was a false statement of the fact, thereby impairing the reputation of the complainant.

However, the evidence duly adopted and examined by the court below.