[2] In a case where the facts charged that Defendant B, the representative director of Defendant C Co., Ltd., Defendant C, used the registered trademark “,” “,” “,” and “”, which are similar to the designated goods, on the goods identical to the designated goods, was found guilty at the court below, the case holding that each crime of violating the Trademark Act, which resulted from the infringement of each of the registered trademark, is an inclusive crime, and that Defendant B’s act of using each of the similar trademarks infringed upon each of the registered trademarks at the same time, and thus, it constitutes an ordinary concurrent crime between these

[2] In a case where Defendant B, the representative director of Defendant C Co., Ltd., was convicted of violating the trademark rights of Defendant C by attaching the trademark “,” and “,” which are similar to the registered trademark “,” and “,” (hereinafter “registered trademark 1 and 2”) to the goods identical to the designated goods and selling them in the Internet shopping mall, etc., the case holding that among the facts charged, the crime of violating the Trademark Act due to the infringement of the first registered trademark and the crime of violating the Trademark Act due to the infringement of the second registered trademark is one comprehensive crime, and that Defendant B simultaneously infringed the first registered trademark and the second registered trademark as a single act of using a similar trademark, and thus, each of them constitutes an ordinary concurrent crime between these crimes

1. The lower court convicted the Defendants of the facts charged in the instant case on the ground that the Defendants’ trademark “,” “,” “,” and “,” used by the Defendants are identical or similar to the victim’s registered trademark “(registration No. 1 omitted),” “(registration No. 2 omitted)” (hereinafter “registered trademark Nos. 1 and 2”) and the marks and designated goods thereof.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the establishment of a crime of violating the Trademark Act due to trademark infringement, or by omitting judgment, etc.

2. Where several trademarks have been infringed on trademark rights under Article 230 of the Trademark Act, each of them constitutes an offense (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Do10759, Jul. 14, 201). However, in a case where several trademarks have been infringed on one of the trademarks using a similar trademark at the same time, each of them violates the Trademark Act is in a mutually competitive relationship.

According to the above legal principle, among the facts charged in this case, the crime of violating the Trademark Act due to the infringement of the first registered trademark of this case and the crime of violating the second registered trademark of this case is one comprehensive crime. Since Defendant 1 simultaneously infringed on the first registered trademark of this case and the second registered trademark of this case by the use of a single similar trademark of this case, each of these comprehensive crimes is an ordinary concurrent crime under Article 40 of the Criminal Act. Therefore, the court below erred by deeming that the court below constitutes a single crime by combining each act of infringing each registered trademark of this case. However, even if punishment is imposed for the most severe crime among the crimes of violating each trademark of this case under Article 40 of the Criminal Act, since there is no difference between the punishment of the court below and the punishment of the court below, it is difficult to view that the error of evaluating the number of crimes affected the conclusion of the judgment (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Do735, Feb. 28, 2003).

3. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Dong-won (Presiding Justice)