In full view of the adopted evidence, the lower court accepted the Plaintiff’s claim for the payment of the instant loan, recognizing that the Plaintiff’s transfer of KRW 16 million to the Defendant on July 19, 2005 and KRW 13,996,000, which was transferred to the Defendant on July 22, 2005, was due to the cause of loan.

The ground of appeal on the nature of the above money paid by the Plaintiff is nothing more than the purport of disputing the selection of evidence and fact-finding which belong to the exclusive jurisdiction of the lower court, which is a fact-finding court, and it is difficult to be deemed a legitimate ground of appeal. Furthermore, in light of the records, even if the lower court’s determination that the above money was a loan which is not an investment deposit, it did not err by either recognizing facts contrary

2. The damages for delay shall be considered ex officio.

Article 3(2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings (hereinafter “Special Act”) provides that “Where it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to resist the existence or scope of the obligation before a fact-finding ruling declaring that the obligor has the obligation to perform the obligation to perform the obligation is rendered, Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the reasonable scope.” Article 3(2) of the same Act provides that “The application of Article 3(1) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc.

"Where it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to dispute whether he/she has an obligation or not" under Article 3 (2) of the Act on Special Cases refers to the time when it is acknowledged that there is a reasonable ground for the obligor's argument as to the existence or scope of the obligation.