2. C.

3. D;

4. E.

5. G.

6. H;

7. I

Attorney Lee Dong-dong, Counsel for the plaintiffs

The Defendant issued an order to return KRW 5,545,80 to Plaintiff B on October 18, 2016, issued an order to return KRW 5,545,80, an order to additionally collect KRW 5,545,800, a disposition to restrict a loan for 360 days from the date of the disposition, an order to return KRW 3,337,50, an order to return KRW 337,337,50, and an additional collection of KRW 330,00 from the date of the disposition, an order to return KRW 3,452,90, an order to return KRW 3,452,90, additional collection of KRW 3,452,90, and an additional collection of KRW 360, KRW 750, KRW 970, KRW 750, KRW 330, KRW 300, KRW 16, KRW 308, KRW 306, KRW 160, KRW 305, and 301.

Purport of appeal

Among the judgment of the first instance, the part against the plaintiffs falling under the order of revocation shall be revoked.

On October 18, 2016, the Defendant issued an order for return of KRW 5,545,80 against Plaintiff B, an order for additional collection of KRW 3,337,500 against Plaintiff C, an order for return of KRW 3,337,500, an order for additional collection of KRW 3,452,90 against Plaintiff D, an order for return of KRW 3,452,90 against Plaintiff D, an order for additional collection of KRW 3,452,90, an order for return of KRW 970,750, KRW 970, KRW 750, KRW 970, KRW 750, KRW 3,800, KRW 3,830,00, KRW 3,830, KRW 00, KRW 106, KRW 150, KRW 1065, KRW 107, KRW 101, KRW 2016, KRW 2017, and the Plaintiffs were revoked.

The reasoning of this court's explanation concerning this case is as follows, and the part of the judgment of the court of first instance is as stated in the corresponding part of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for adding the judgment as to the plaintiffs' assertion, such as Paragraph (2). Thus, the grounds asserted by the plaintiffs in this court are not significantly different from the contents claimed by the plaintiffs in the court of first instance, and the judgment of the court of first instance rejecting the plaintiffs' assertion is justified even if the evidence submitted in the court of first instance was newly examined, even if it was examined again by examining the evidence submitted in the court of first instance.)

(c) Foods;

A. The 5th page 3 did not “C,” and the Defendant, around May 26, 2016, requested the Plaintiffs to submit a written investigation and a written confirmation for the investigation of additional facts, but did not present any opinion.”

B. The court in Part 6 of the Second Instance is "In Mancheon District Court". The following is added between the six pages 19 and 20. On the other hand, the prosecutor, on November 26, 2014, issued a non-prosecution disposition to the Plaintiff E, on December 22, 2014, against Plaintiff D, G, and Plaintiff B and C on December 23, 2014, on the violation of the Subsidy Management Act relating to the illegal receipt of training costs."

(d)No. 15 of the sixth 20th page "(15)" shall be changed to "15(including each number; hereinafter the same shall apply)".

E. The following is added between the 8th and 18th class. “Although the contractual hours between instructors and AG have been limited to 3 hours a day, the Plaintiffs asserted that the Plaintiff’s infant care teachers employed by the Plaintiffs have received 4 hours of education since they had received 4 hours of education. However, in addition to the Plaintiffs’ assertion, it is distinguishable from the lecture hours and the practice hours, and there is no objective evidence to prove that the Plaintiff was neither an instructor nor an instructor was absent from attendance during the practice hours, this part of the Plaintiffs’ assertion is rejected.”

F. From the 19th to the 10th 2nd 2nd 10th am as follows. “False or other unlawful means defined as the grounds for each disciplinary measure under Articles 55 and 56 of the former Act on the Development of Workplace Skills of Workers (wholly amended by Act No. 12627, May 20, 2014; hereinafter referred to as “the Act on the Development of Workplace Skills of Workers”) refers to all affirmative and passive acts that may affect the decision-making on the payment of training fees, as all those acts that are not correct under the social norms in order for a person who is not eligible to receive training fees to see that he/she is qualified or to conceal the fact that he/she is not eligible to receive training fees (see Supreme Court Decision 2012Du24764, Jul. 24, 2014). In addition, a disciplinary measure imposed on a violation of administrative statutes to achieve administrative purposes, and thus, a sanction is imposed on a person who is a real manager, but not a statutory manager, and may be imposed on a person (see Supreme Court Decision 21010.

With respect to the instant case, as seen earlier, the Plaintiffs filed an application for subsidization of training expenses without confirming whether each affiliated infant care teacher completed training courses, even though each affiliated infant care teacher was unable to properly complete training courses, and whether the application for subsidization of training expenses was appropriate. This constitutes an act that is not correct under the social norms by concealing the fact that a person ineligible for subsidization of training expenses is not qualified or is not qualified, and even in such a case, if the Plaintiffs were to have intentionally requested, it is difficult to secure the effectiveness of the provision on sanctions. Therefore, it is reasonable to deem that the Plaintiffs received the subsidization of training expenses by fraud or other improper means, even if the Plaintiffs were not subject to a non-prosecution disposition due to the fact that they were suspected by the investigation agency or not. Accordingly, the Defendant may make a return order and additional collection against the Plaintiffs pursuant to Article 56(2) and (3) of the Act on the Development of Workers’ Vocational Ability. The Plaintiffs’ allegation in this part

G. From 10th to 20th 14th 10th am as follows. According to the statement of evidence A, it is recognized that the Ministry of Employment and Labor sent "in relation to the result of the investigation into the illegal receipt of training fees for the business owner of the Incheon Bupyeong Police Station on April 12, 2016, the Ministry of Employment and Labor, including the defendant, to the competent administrative agency, including the defendant, a guidance, including the criteria for the administrative disposition for the illegal training of the business owner (hereinafter referred to as the "base of this case").

1) The employer's disposition ○ (prosecution case) prosecutor's investigation results on the case for which the investigation by the employer is terminated, and the business owner's suspicion of illegal receipt is verified upon cooperation with the prosecutor's investigation results, shall be denied.

The case where it is not clearly confirmed that the illegal act is not clearly confirmed, such as 'the suspension of prosecution and the non-prosecution of the prosecution (in the case of non-prosecution)', in accordance with the case of ‘the suspension of prosecution and the progress of investigation' as the data of the prosecutor investigation / [2] The case where the suspension of prosecution or investigation is being conducted after a separate investigation by the employment center / [2] where the business owner's voluntary declaration is made by the ○ (in the case of a self-reported business owner), the case where the fact of the illegal receipt is not verified through the ○ (in the case of a self-reported business owner)-(in the case of a non-reported business owner's voluntary declaration, the case is excluded from the administrative disposition - the case where the fact of the illegal receipt is not verified through the written investigation document and written confirmation document (including evidential documents) submitted by the mail business owner and the written confirmation document submitted by the e-mail business owner, etc.

According to the instant standard, in the event that prosecutor's investigation was completed and prosecuted, the administrative agency may conduct a disposition procedure against the business owner when the business owner's suspicion of illegal receipt is confirmed after confirming the data of the prosecutor's investigation results by the prosecutor's office. However, if the suspicion of illegal receipt is unclear only with the investigation results by the prosecutor's investigation results, it is confirmed whether the business owner received illegal receipt through a written investigation and a written confirmation, etc., and if the business owner fails to submit it, it may make a decision on whether to take an administrative disposition by conducting an additional investigation, such as an appearance investigation. However, as seen earlier, even if the plaintiffs were prosecuted by the representative of AG, etc., and even if the plaintiffs were not subject to a disposition that is not suspected of suspicion by the prosecutor's office, the defendant sent training fees to the plaintiffs, who are the business owner, on the basis of the data delivered by the investigative agency pursuant to the instant standard, and provided them with an opportunity to present their opinions by illegal means, but the plaintiffs did not present any opinion. Therefore, the defendant's assertion in this part of this case is without merit.

H. According to the 12th 12th 1st 1st , “If any” means “if any, the training is as follows.” “If the Plaintiffs did not know that the training courses were conducted in a manner that falls short of the standards, as alleged by the Plaintiffs, and they did not intend to do so to the Plaintiffs, even though they did not know that the training courses were conducted in a manner that falls short of the standards, in the case of Sundays, the Plaintiffs could have known that the training courses were conducted in an abnormal manner, and if they paid due attention, the training was conducted in a normal manner, even if they could have easily known that the training courses were conducted, and the period for which the Plaintiffs were unlawfully received is not so short.” (The considerable portion of the training costs subsidized by the Plaintiffs by unlawful means is the situation in which the return order and additional collection is impossible due to the expiration of the extinctive prescription period)

2. The portion to be determined additionally in the trial;

A. Determination as to the illegal prior notice argument

1) The plaintiffs asserted that each of the dispositions of this case was unlawful since they did not guarantee the period of submission of opinions with a reasonable period of time in advance notice of each of the dispositions of this case. However, in full view of the overall purport of Gap evidence 2-1, 3-1, 4-1, 6-1, 6-1, 8-1, 9-1, 10-1, 17, Eul evidence 3, 5, 9-2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9-2, 10-1, 200, 30, 6-1, 20, 30, 16-2, 30, 16-1, 20, 16-2, 30, 16-1, 16, 30, 206, 16-1, 16, 206, 30, 206, 16, 2016.

According to the above facts of recognition, since the defendant notification to the plaintiffs that each of the dispositions of this case can be made continuously from April 2016 and demanded the plaintiffs to submit their opinions, the plaintiffs are guaranteed to submit their opinions. This part of the plaintiffs' assertion is without merit.

C. Determination on the unspecified assertion of the facts based on the disposition

1) The plaintiffs did not specifically verify the facts, such as individual training courses of infant care teachers belonging to the plaintiffs, and were uniformly punished against all employers, including the plaintiffs, on the basis of the results of investigation related to AG, on the ground of unjust payment of training expenses. They asserted to the effect that it is unlawful since the defendant did not specify the factual grounds of disposition and transferred the burden of proof to the plaintiffs.

2) In principle, the burden of proof in an administrative litigation that is applied mutatis mutandis under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Act is allocated among the parties in accordance with the general principles of civil procedure. In the case of an appeal litigation, the Defendant, who asserts the legality of the disposition, bears the burden of proof as to the legal ground. In a case where there is a reasonable and acceptable proof as to the legality of a certain disposition asserted by the Defendant, the disposition can be deemed justifiable, and the assertion and proof of exceptional circumstances return to the Plaintiff, who is the other party (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Du42817, Oct. 27, 2016)

3) As to the instant case, the Defendant requested the Plaintiffs to submit a written investigation and a written confirmation to the investigative agency on the basis of the data received from the investigative agency, but failed to do so, and thus, the Defendant issued each instant disposition based on the data notified to the investigative agency. Since a criminal judgment was finalized against the representatives of the training agency, as the investigative agency later notified the Defendant, the premise of each of the instant dispositions that “nicking teachers affiliated with the Plaintiffs were provided with subsidies for training costs in an unlawful manner even though they failed to meet the completion standards by attending less than 80% of the training course,” is determined to have been reasonably acceptable evidence. Accordingly, the burden of proving the fact that the childcare teachers affiliated with the Plaintiffs received education at least 80% of the attendance rate shall return to the Plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs did not submit any opinion even after receiving the Defendant’s voluntary report and written investigation from the Defendant regarding the illegal receipt of training costs, and did not err by the Defendant’s fact-finding, and did not assert specific facts about the actual training hours of the Plaintiffs, or did not present any evidence.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiffs' claim of this case (excluding the part on which the plaintiffs' claim for the revocation of each restriction on financing of the plaintiffs except the plaintiff H) shall be dismissed as it is without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of first instance on this issue is just in conclusion, and the plaintiffs' appeal is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judge Park Jong-soo

Judges Han Young-young