In the instant case where only the Defendant lodged an unfair appeal for sentencing, the lower court reversed the entire judgment of the first instance court that found the Defendant guilty of the instant facts charged in order to deliberate and decide on the employment restriction order, which is an incidental disposition, by applying Article 56(1) of the amended Act, pursuant to Article 3 of the Addenda to the Act on the Protection of Juveniles from Sexual Abuse (hereinafter “amended Act”), which was amended by Act No. 15352, Jan. 16, 2018, and ordered the Defendant to complete a program for treating sexual assault for three years and 40 hours identical to the first instance trial, and ordered the employment restriction for three years.

In light of the record, the lower court did not err in its judgment by infringing the Defendant’s right to defense or violating the principle of disadvantage and disadvantage by violating due process related to the imposition of employment restriction orders.

The argument that the judgment of the court below erred by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations as to the allegation of impossible attempted punishment and by exceeding its discretion in the application of the grounds for sentencing is ultimately an unfair argument of sentencing.

According to Article 383 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, only in cases where death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment with or without prison labor for not less than ten years is imposed, an appeal shall be allowed on the grounds of unfair sentencing.

In this case where a more minor sentence is imposed against the defendant, the argument that the punishment is too unreasonable is not a legitimate ground for appeal.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.