2. The determination of sentencing is based on the statutory penalty, based on the discretionary determination that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope by taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing as prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act, and there is a unique area of the first deliberation in our criminal litigation law taking the trial-oriented principle and the principle of directness.

In addition, in light of these circumstances and the ex post facto in-depth nature of the appellate court, it is reasonable to respect the sentencing in the event that there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance does not deviate from the reasonable scope of the discretion. Although the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of the discretion, it is desirable to refrain from rendering a sentence that differs from the first instance court by destroying the first instance judgment solely on the ground that the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of the discretion of the appellate court (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). The lower court sentenced the above sentence to the Defendant on the grounds of the sentencing stated in its reasoning, such as: (a) the Defendant was led to the confession of and against the offense; and (b) the Defendant was able to make a person by reporting to an investigative agency; and (c) the Defendant has already been sentenced to punishment beyond the reasonable scope of the punishment in the lower court, despite the fact that the Defendant has been subject to criminal punishment for repeated violations of the Act.

It is not visible, and it is reasonable to respect the sentencing of the lower court because there is no particular change in the sentencing conditions in the trial.