2. In light of the fact that the sentencing is made within a reasonable and appropriate scope by comprehensively taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act based on the statutory penalty, and the fact that the sentencing is made within the reasonable and reasonable scope after the appellate court’s ex post facto review nature, etc., it is reasonable to respect the sentencing in a case where there is no change in the conditions for sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion. Even though the first instance sentencing falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to reverse the first instance judgment on the sole ground that the sentence differs from the appellate court’s opinion, and to refrain from imposing a sentence that does not differ from the first instance judgment on the ground that the first instance judgment is somewhat different from the appellate court’s opinion (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). In addition, the sentencing conditions are not changed compared with the original judgment, and the sentencing criteria in light of the theory of the records and the conditions revealed in the instant sentencing and the sentencing.

There is no circumstance that it is deemed unfair to maintain the judgment of the court below as it is or the judgment of the court below is assessed.

Therefore, the prosecutor's improper argument of sentencing is not accepted.

3. In conclusion, the prosecutor's appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act on the grounds that the prosecutor's appeal is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.