2. Under our criminal litigation law, which takes the principle of court-oriented trials and the principle of direct determination, there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court, and where the first instance court’s sentencing does not go beyond the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect it. It is desirable to reverse the first instance judgment and to refrain from rendering a sentence without any difference between the first instance court and the first instance court solely on the ground that the sentence of sentencing of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, although the opinion of the appellate court is somewhat different from that of the appellate court (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). In light of the foregoing legal principles, even though the Defendant did not recognize the instant crime, the crime of the instant crime is not relatively heavy, and the Defendant is a first offender, etc., the lower court’s argument that the sentencing exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion is not recognized, and thus, is not recognized to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion.

3. In conclusion, the prosecutor's appeal is dismissed without pleading pursuant to Article 364 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Act, since it is obvious that the prosecutor's appeal is groundless. It is so decided as per Disposition.