Defendant .

The first instance court’s punishment [the fine of KRW 2,500,000 for the violation of each Public Official Election Act and the Act on Promotion, etc. of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection (Defamation)] and the second instance court’s punishment (the fine of KRW 2,500,000 for the crime of insult is too unreasonable.

Of the judgment of the first instance court, the remaining parts of the judgment of the court of first instance excluding the offense of insult and the judgment of the second instance excluding the part of the judgment of the court of second instance renders an appeal against each of the judgment of the court below, and the defendant filed an appeal against each of the judgment of the court of second instance excluding the part of the offense of insult among the judgment of the court of first instance excluding the remaining parts of the offense of insult and the judgment of the second instance excluding the part of the judgment of the court of second instance excluding the part of the offense of insult ] are concurrent crimes under Article 38(1) of the Criminal

Of the judgment of the first instance, the first instance court determined the punishment by comprehensively taking into account the circumstances favorable to the defendant and unfavorable circumstances, as stated in its holding, regarding the allegation of unfair sentencing on the part of the offense of insult. There is no special change in circumstances that could change the punishment of the first instance court.

In full view of the Defendant’s age, occupation, character and conduct, environment, family relationship, health status, criminal records and the contents thereof, crime quality, motive, means and result of the crime, etc., and various circumstances that form the conditions for sentencing as shown in this Court’s oral argument, it cannot be said that the first instance court’s punishment against the Defendant is too unfair because it goes beyond the reasonable scope of its discretion.

Therefore, the defendant's assertion of unfair sentencing as to the offense of insult in the first instance judgment is without merit.

In conclusion, the remaining parts of the judgment of the court of first instance excluding the insulting part and the judgment of the court of second instance excluding the insulting part are subject to ex officio reversal.