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(영문) 서울고등법원 2019.12.12 2019나2036842

물품대금

Text

1. The defendant's appeal and the plaintiff's successor's motion to intervene in the succession are all dismissed.

2. After an appeal is filed.

Reasons

On May 8, 2014, the Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against the Defendant. The first instance court served the Defendant with litigation documents, such as a copy of the complaint of this case and a notice of the date for pleading, on October 7, 2014, when the Defendant was absent, on the first day for pleading, and concluded the pleadings. On October 23, 2014, the Plaintiff filed a judgment citing part of the Plaintiff’s claim against the claim against the Defendant, and the original copy of the judgment was served on the Defendant by public notice.

On November 1, 2014, the Plaintiff transferred the instant claim to the intervenors.

After that, on September 27, 2018, an intervenor applied for grant of succession execution clause with respect to the judgment of the first instance court on September 27, 2018. On October 30, 2018, the above court granted the succeeding execution clause to an intervenor on the same day, and sent a certified copy of the succeeding execution clause to the defendant on the same day. The defendant received a certified copy of the succeeding execution clause directly on November 5, 2018.

On July 19, 2019, the Defendant filed an appeal for subsequent completion.

[Ground of recognition] The records clearly revealed facts, Gap 5 through 7, and 10 evidence, and the purport of the whole pleadings of this case is legitimate, Article 173 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides that "if the parties concerned could not comply with the peremptory period due to any cause not attributable to them, they may supplement the litigation by neglecting to do so within two weeks from the date on which such cause ceases to exist," and "where the judgment of the court of first instance was served by service by public notice, the time when the cause ceases to exist" under Article 173 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act refers not to the time when the defendant was not simply aware of the fact that the judgment was served by public notice, but to the time when the judgment became known by public notice. In ordinary cases, the defendant is