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(영문) 대법원 1966. 9. 20. 선고 66다1032 판결

[소유권이전등기][집14(3)민,040]

Main Issues

The case where it is difficult to regard it as a judicial claim, which is the cause of suspending prescriptive acquisition.

Summary of Judgment

The selection of evidence shall be decided by the free conviction of the judge of the fact-finding court, and even if part of testimony of a witness is reliable and other parts are not reliable, it shall not be disputed by the court of final appeal unless it is contrary to the logical or empirical rules.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 168 of the Civil Act

Plaintiff-Appellant

[Judgment of the court below]

Defendant-Appellee

Defendant (Attorney Park Jong-dae, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

original decision

Daegu High Court Decision 64Na567 delivered on April 25, 1966

Text

The part of the original judgment on the plaintiff's ancillary claim shall be reversed, and the case shall be remanded to the Daegu High Court.

The appeal by the plaintiff on the part of the main claim shall be dismissed.

Reasons

The ground of appeal No. 1 by the Plaintiff’s attorney is examined.

The selection of evidence shall be decided by the free conviction of the judge of the fact-finding court, and even if some of the testimonys of a witness is reliable and the other parts are not reliable, it is not against the logical or empirical rules.

According to the reasoning theory of the original judgment, the original court, like the theory of lawsuit, shall use part of Non-party 1's testimony as data for fact-finding, and shall reject the part that conflict with the fact-finding of the original court among the testimony of the witness. Even if the records were to be recorded, it cannot be found that there was an error of disregarding the logical or empirical rules. Thus, the arguments cannot be adopted merely because they criticize the legitimate fact-finding of the original court.

We examine the second ground for appeal.

Based on the records of the case, although examining the contents of Non-Party 2, Non-Party 3, Non-Party 5, Non-Party 6, and Non-Party 7's testimony and evidence Nos. 3-1, 2-4 of this case, it is not possible to find that Non-Party 8, a student of the defendant, obtained the right of representation from the defendant to sell the land in this case lawfully. Thus, it is just that the judgment of the court below is just, and it is not possible that the judgment violated the rules of evidence or the reasons are not inferred.

The ground of appeal No. 3 is examined.

According to the plaintiff representative of the first instance court on October 20, 1964 stated on October 20, 1964 as the date of pleading of the first instance court on October 27, 1964, the plaintiff asserted that the plaintiff, as a preliminary claim, even though the defendant's dong non-party 8 did not have the right of representation and the sale of this case has no validity, the plaintiff, as the plaintiff started possession of the real estate in good faith with the intention of ownership from the time of purchase, and entered into a registration of ownership transfer by prescription as of October 20, 1954, since the ten-year prescription has expired. The court failed to make any decision on this point, and failed to decide on important matters that might affect the judgment, and thus, the part dismissing the plaintiff's appeal on the plaintiff's preliminary claim shall not be relieved.

The grounds of appeal Nos. 4 and 5 are examined.

According to the reasoning of the judgment, the court below rejected the plaintiff's claim for the transfer registration of ownership due to the lapse of the 20-year period for the plaintiff's conjunctive claimant, and the prescriptive acquisition shall be interrupted as a judicial claim. It includes not only cases where the other party has actively asserted ownership against the other party, but also cases where the other party has brought a lawsuit by asserting ownership and sought a judgment of dismissal. According to the records, as to the claim of this case where the plaintiff asserted that he acquired ownership from the defendant on September 8, 1964, the defendant denied the plaintiff's claim while seeking a judgment of dismissal on September 8, 1964, and it stated that the land of this case was owned by the defendant. Thus, the prescriptive acquisition period of the plaintiff's claim for the transfer registration of ownership is suspended as a statement, and it is hard to find that the plaintiff's claim for the transfer registration of ownership is void due to the expiration of the initial period for the transfer registration of ownership under the principle of pleading or the principle of possession of real estate, and it cannot be viewed that the plaintiff's claim for sale of this case constitutes 140.

Therefore, even on the basis of this point, the original judgment is unreasonable and thus is not exempt from reversal.

Therefore, the part on the plaintiff's conjunctive claim among the original judgment is reversed and remanded to the court below on the ground that the plaintiff's grounds of appeal 3, 4, and 5 are well-grounded. The appeal on this claim is groundless and dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices, as per Disposition under Articles 400 and 406 of the Civil Procedure Act.

Supreme Court Judge Ma-man (Presiding Judge) Ma-dong (Presiding Judge)

심급 사건
-대구고등법원 1966.4.25.선고 64나567
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