2. The part of the judgment of the court below against the defendant against the plaintiff F and G concerning the deceased H's share of the consolation money, and the part against the defendant against the plaintiff I concerning the deceased K's share of the deceased K's consolation money due to the death of the deceased J shall be reversed, and this part of the case shall be remanded to the Seoul High Court.

3. All of the plaintiffs' appeals and the defendant's remaining appeals are dismissed.

4. All costs of the lawsuit between the plaintiffs A, B, C, D, and E are borne by the above plaintiffs. The costs of the appeal by the defendant against the plaintiffs other than the above plaintiffs and plaintiffs F, G, and I are borne by the defendant. The costs of the appeal by the plaintiffs are borne by the plaintiffs.

1. Judgment on the plaintiffs' grounds of appeal

A. In principle, the amount of consolation money for emotional distress suffered by tort can be determined by the fact-finding court in consideration of all the circumstances. Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, the amount of consolation money recognized by the court below cannot be deemed to be significantly contrary to the principle of equity. Therefore, there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles on the calculation of consolation money, contrary to what is alleged in

B. As to the assertion of mistake of facts as to the recognition of victims, the lower court rejected the Plaintiff L et al.’s claim that the person who made a sacrifice was killed due to the Defendant’s unlawful execution of duties by the public officials belonging to the Defendant, based on the following circumstances: (a) there is insufficient evidence to recognize the Plaintiff’s decedent as the victim of the National Report Federation case; and (b) the evidence other than the investigation materials of the Reorganization Commission was prepared after the instant lawsuit, and it is difficult to believe that the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff et al. was insufficient to recognize that the person who made a sacrifice was killed due to the Defendant’s unlawful performance of duties by the public officials belonging to the Defendant; and (c) rejected the Plaintiff L et al.’s claim that the person who made a sacrifice as the bereaved family member of the said person.

In light of the records, the fact-finding and judgment of the court below are just and acceptable. Contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there is no violation of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules. (2) The court below also rejected the plaintiff W, X, and Y (the Z, the habitats of UPV, and its own consciousness)'s claim on the ground that T, which is confirmed as a victim of the National Reporting Federation case, cannot be recognized as the same person as U or V, based on its stated reasoning.

In light of the records, the fact-finding and judgment of the court below are just and acceptable. Contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, the court below did not exhaust all necessary deliberations and did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence.

2. Judgment on the Defendant’s grounds of appeal

A. According to the records as to the ground of appeal No. 1, E, a person of the joint plaintiff of the first instance court, had already died on July 17, 2009, before the instant lawsuit was filed, but the first instance court rendered a judgment of winning part of the first instance court's name after the lawsuit was filed, and the plaintiff A, B, C, and D, his heir of the first instance court reached the lower court's judgment. < Amended by Presidential Decree No. 24517, Feb. 2, 2013>

15. We can find that the court below accepted the request for correction of the indication of the party, and rendered a judgment that partly accepted the above plaintiffs' claim.

However, a lawsuit that has already been filed in the name of the deceased E is illegal, and a request for the correction of the indication by the inheritor is not permissible.

Therefore, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the correction of the party indication, which affected the conclusion of the judgment, in accepting the request for correction of the party indication by the plaintiff A, B, C, and D, and rendered a judgment in favor of some of the above plaintiffs. The argument in the grounds of appeal pointing this out is justified. (2) On the other hand, according to the records, the plaintiffs' attorney can be known to have lawfully received the delegation of litigation from the plaintiff A, AB, and the lawsuit in this case was brought. Thus, the judgment of the court below which rendered a decision on the merits against the above plaintiffs' claim did not err by misapprehending the legal principles

B. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

After recognizing the facts as indicated in its reasoning based on the adopted evidence, the lower court determined that the remaining persons, other than T, among those identified as victims of the National Reporting Franchise incident by the Mediation Committee, were sacrificed by the police officers and soldiers belonging to the Defendant without due process. In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court’s determination is justifiable and acceptable. In so doing, contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors by misapprehending the legal principles regarding the principle of trial on evidence and the principle of burden of proof, or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations,

C. Regarding ground of appeal No. 3

The court below held that the lawsuit of this case was about nine months from the date of truth-finding decision and about eleven months from the date of fact-finding decision.

13. In this case, the defendant's defense of extinctive prescription cannot be allowed because it constitutes an abuse of rights against the principle of good faith.

In light of the relevant legal principles, the judgment of the court below is just and acceptable, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors of misapprehending the legal principles on abuse of rights in the statute of limitations defense.

D. According to the records as to the ground of appeal No. 4, the Defendant’s heir of the deceased Party AC, the victim of the National Report Federation’s case, was the wife, the Plaintiff F (M, marriage on April 4, 1959), the Plaintiff G (M, marriage on April 1965), and Plaintiff AD (M, South). Among them, H died on January 24, 198.

Before the enforcement of the current Civil Code, if a male who is not the head of family dies before the enforcement of the current Civil Code, it was customary in the Republic of Korea to inherit the property equally to the children who are lineal descendants in the same family register, and Article 1009(2) of the former Civil Code (amended by Act No. 4199 of Jan. 13, 190) provides that "the inheritance portion of a woman who does not have the same family register shall be 1/4 of the inheritance portion of the male," so the above plaintiffs' claim for consolation money due to the death of the deceased AC shall be deemed to have succeeded to the proportion of 1/3 of each of the above plaintiffs, and the deceased H's claim for consolation money shall be deemed to have succeeded to the proportion of 4/6 of the plaintiff F, G, and the plaintiff AD.

Nevertheless, the lower court determined that Plaintiff F and G inherited not only the deceased AC’s claim of consolation money but also the deceased H’s claim of consolation money at the rate of 1/3, respectively. In so determining, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on statutory shares in inheritance under the former Civil Act, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal pointing this out has merit. (2) In addition, the lower court determined that the deceased K’s claim of consolation money unique to the deceased K due to the sacrifice of the deceased J was generated, and that the Plaintiff, the wife of the deceased K, succeeded to the claim.

However, according to the records, the deceased J and the deceased K were called to the North Korean War on July 8, 1950 in the case of the People's Report Federation, and they were detained in the North Korean National School, and they were detained in the North Korean National School on July 9, 1950, and there is no material that can identify the death of the deceased in the house of the deceased in the same area around July 9, 1950. Therefore, the deceased J and the deceased K are presumed to have died at the same time in accordance with Article 30 of the Civil Act. Therefore, it cannot be deemed that the deceased K had a claim for consolation money unique to the deceased K due to the sacrifice by the deceased K.

Nevertheless, the lower court determined otherwise on the ground that the Plaintiff succeeded to the claim of consolation money unique to the deceased K due to the sacrifice of the networkJ, and thus, there was an error of law by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the presumption of simultaneous death, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. The allegation in the grounds of appeal pointing this out also has justifiable grounds. (3) Meanwhile, the lower court determined that Plaintiff AF inherited the above deceased’s claim of consolation money arising from the sacrifice of the network AE, and that Plaintiff AF inherited the deceased’s claim of consolation money arising from the sacrifice of the network AG, and that the above deceased’s claim of consolation money arising from the sacrifice of the deceased’s sacrifice was inherited by father AH according to the old custom, and thereafter inherited by Plaintiff AJ, AK, and AL through AI, the wife’s wife.

In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the judgment of the court below is just and acceptable. Contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors by misapprehending the legal principles on the confirmation of successors according to the former custom.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below regarding the plaintiff A, B, C, and D shall be reversed, and since the part concerning the plaintiff A, B, C, and D, which is the predecessor, is sufficient for this court to directly judge, the decision of the court of first instance regarding E shall be revoked and dismissed.

The part of the judgment of the court below against the defendant against the plaintiff F and G concerning the deceased H's share of inheritance of consolation money and the part against the defendant against the plaintiff I concerning the deceased K's share of inheritance of consolation money due to the death of the deceased J is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The plaintiffs' appeal and the defendant's remaining appeals are dismissed.

All costs of the lawsuit between the plaintiffs A, B, C, D, and E are borne by the above plaintiffs, and the costs of the appeal by the defendant against the plaintiffs other than the above plaintiffs, F, G, and I are borne by the defendant. The costs of the appeal by the plaintiffs are borne by the plaintiffs. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee In-bok

Justices Kim Yong-deok

Justices Lee Dong-won