A. The Plaintiff is the owner of the land and the building on the ground, which is the owner of the land and the building on the ground, and the Defendant B is a person who leased part of the building on the Plaintiff’s ownership and operated the Vice Minister of Damage and Loss of Motor Vehicles, and the Defendant C was a person who constructed a new building on the ground of the land on the land of

B. When Defendant C came to know that the tea screen owned by the Plaintiff was installed in the course of the above construction work, he paid KRW 25,000,000 to Defendant B, and demanded the removal thereof. Defendant B voluntarily removed the luminous screen made up of KRW 2,140,000 of the market price owned by the Plaintiff on February 10, 2018, at his own discretion, KRW 2,140,000, and KRW 4 and a tent.

The Defendants were indicted due to the property damage and damage of the foregoing light screen, and received a summary order of KRW 1,00,000 from the Changwon District Court Decision 2018Da5545 on September 28, 2018, each of which was subject to a fine of KRW 1,500,000, and the said summary order became final and conclusive.

[Ground of Recognition] between the plaintiff and the defendant B: The facts of no dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant C pursuant to Article 150(3) and (1) of the Civil Procedure Act; Gap's evidence 1, 2, Eul's evidence 1 to 6(b) (including the number of pages)

2. According to the above facts, the defendants are jointly and severally removed the light screen screen owned by the plaintiff, and therefore, the defendants are obligated to pay damages for delay calculated at each rate of 12% per annum as stipulated in the Civil Act, from February 10, 2018, which is the date of tort, to February 28, 2020, to dispute the existence and scope of the performance obligation from February 10, 2018, equivalent to the re-establishment cost, and from February 10, 2018, the existence and scope of the performance obligation.

As to this, Defendant C was not an individual but an act as the representative director of F Co., Ltd., the owner of the above E, and thus, Defendant C was the principal.