1. As to the Defendant’s ground of appeal on the admissibility of common evidence and litigation conditions

(a) Illegally collected evidence;

1) Non-Indicted 1’s outer kids, etc.

On the grounds indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that: (a) Nonindicted 1’s right to participate in the process of analyzing and printing the information lawfully seized to Nonindicted 1 by means of copying it in the form of electromagnetic wave on January 11, 2018 when the investigative agency executed a search and seizure warrant; and (b) analyzing and printing the information confiscated after the completion of the search and seizure procedure at the prosecutor’s office; and (c) the evidence alleged by the Defendant as having no relevance to the criminal facts stated in the warrant is not unlawful; and (d) the aforementioned search and seizure did not constitute a violation of the procedure regarding the right to participate as alleged by the Defendant even when the evidence duly seized was again seized; and (e) determined that the information seized by Nonindicted 1 and its admissibility

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal doctrine and evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the rules of exclusion of illegally collected evidence, as otherwise stated in the grounds of appeal, failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, or exceeding the bounds of the principle

2) Nonindicted 2 USB and PC

On the grounds indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that: (a) Nonindicted 2 voluntarily produced electronic information contained in the USB and PC on February 5, 2018 without limiting the scope thereof; and (b) the said electronic information was already seized by a search and seizure warrant on January 12, 2018 and issued a detailed list of seized information at the time of search and seizure pursuant to the above search and seizure warrant; (c) the failure to issue a separate list does not constitute an unlawful collection of evidence; (d) there is no evidence to deem that Nonindicted 2 produced and received electronic information contained in the USB of Nonindicted 2 in the office of secretary general secretary general, and thus, it is admissible as evidence based on the electronic information and evidence contained in the USB and PC.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal doctrine and evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the rules of exclusion of illegally collected evidence, as otherwise stated in the grounds of appeal, failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, or exceeding the bounds of the principle

3) Non-Indicted 3’s external humd

On the grounds indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that: (a) Nonindicted 3 voluntarily submitted all electronic information contained in the outer Hyde without limiting the scope on March 12, 2018; and (b) during that process, Nonindicted 3 voluntarily voluntarily submitted all the electronic information pertaining to the issuance of a list of seized articles; and (c) Nonindicted 3’s violation of the aforementioned procedural provisions cannot be deemed to have infringed on the substantive contents of due process in light of various circumstances as indicated in its reasoning, including the fact that Nonindicted 3 waived the right to participate; and (b) accordingly, it was admissible as evidence based on the electronic information contained in Nonindicted 3 external Hyde and its evidence.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal doctrine and evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the rules of exclusion of illegally collected evidence, as otherwise stated in the grounds of appeal, failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, or exceeding the bounds of the principle

4) ○ building seized articles

For the reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court determined that the seized articles and evidence based thereon are admissible, on the ground that, on January 25, 2018, the articles seized at the time of search and seizure are acknowledged as subjective and objective relations between the facts stated in the warrant and the facts stated in the warrant, and subsequent search and seizure by a separate search and seizure warrant is lawful.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal doctrine and evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the rules of exclusion of illegally collected evidence, as otherwise stated in the grounds of appeal, failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, or exceeding the bounds of the principle

5) Seized articles after theft

Guaranteeing the dignity and value of the people as human beings belongs to the basic duties of state agencies, and this ought to be realized in criminal proceedings. However, since all evidence related to the private life area of the people cannot be deemed immediately prohibited from submitting them, the court should decide whether to allow it by balancing the benefits of protection, such as the public interest of discovery of truth in effective criminal prosecution and criminal proceedings and personal interests of individuals (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Do1244, Nov. 28, 2013).

For the reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court determined that the materials of Nonindicted Co. 6 (hereinafter “Nonindicted Co. 6”) which were seized by Nonindicted Co. 4 and Nonindicted 5 (hereinafter “Nonindicted Co. 6”) were admissible in light of various circumstances as indicated in its reasoning, including the importance of evidence necessary for the prosecution of criminal prosecution and the possibility of excluding illegality, since Nonindicted Co. 6 was under custody by Nonindicted Co. 4 and Nonindicted Co. 5, and thus, it cannot be deemed that Nonindicted Co. 6 already renounced the ownership of the above materials, or that there was a legal interest that is infringed upon by disclosure of personal information, such as personal information, as it does not appear to be trade secret.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal doctrine and evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the rules of exclusion from illegally collected evidence, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence

(b) Identity and integrity of seized articles;

For the reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court determined that the admissibility of evidence is admissible on the grounds that each printed article of Nonindicted Party 1’s outer lad, etc., Nonindicted Party 2’s USB and PC, and Nonindicted Party 3’s external ladroids can be recognized as identical and integrity, and Nonindicted Party 6’s materials, which were seized by Nonindicted Party 4 and Nonindicted Party 5, are merely documents other than seized information storage device or its printed material, and it is difficult to deem it as evidence to verify the identity and integrity of the seized information storage device or its printed material, or subsequent to the completion of examination

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on identity and integrity as shown in the grounds of appeal, failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, or exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation

(c) cancellation or withdrawal of consent to evidence;

The lower court, on the grounds indicated in its reasoning, determined that it is difficult to view that the Defendant revoked or withdrawn the consent of the evidence on the protocol in which Nonindicted 2 and Nonindicted 1’s statements were written, on the grounds that the Defendant denied the discretion and credibility of Nonindicted 2 and Nonindicted 1’s statements.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the revocation or withdrawal of consent to evidence, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical

On the other hand, the defendant alleged that he revoked or revoked his consent to evidence related to the articles seized in Nonindicted Party 1, etc., Nonindicted Party 2’s USB and PC, Nonindicted Party 3’s external cargo, and ○○ Building. However, such assertion is not a legitimate ground of appeal as it is alleged in the ground of appeal that the court below specifically asserted within the period for submission of the grounds of appeal and did not consider it as the object of judgment ex officio. In light of the relevant legal principles, the judgment of the court below is not erroneous.

D. Voluntaryness of Nonindicted 1 and Nonindicted 2’s statements

The lower court, on the grounds indicated in its reasoning, determined that the discretion of Nonindicted 1 and Nonindicted 2’s statements could be recognized.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the Voluntaryness of statements, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence

E. Violation of the principle of indictment only

In light of the type and contents of the crime as stated in the facts charged, the issue of violation of the principle of an indictment only shall be specifically determined in the relevant case based on the contents of the documents and other things attached or quoted in the indictment, and whether the facts recorded in the indictment other than those required by statutes may hinder the judge or jury from understanding the substance of the crime (Supreme Court en banc Decision 2009Do7436 Decided October 22, 2009).

For the reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court determined that: (a) for the remainder of the facts charged except for the facts charged in violation of the Presidential Records Management Act (hereinafter “Presidential Records Act”), a documentary evidence investigation has already been completed; and (b) the prosecutor was required to indicate specific circumstances in order to clarify the Defendant’s criminal intent, conspiracy, motive and circumstance of the crime; and (c) it is not prohibited to state the facts in the basic facts; and (d) the prosecutor recognized that the contents of the document and the partial contents of the document were written in the indictment for the purpose of clearly indicating the contents of the document related to the elements of the crime, and determined that the court cannot be deemed to have reached the degree that it could interfere with the understanding of the substance of the crime.

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the above legal principles, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to the principle of an indictment only.

(f) Suspension of statute of limitations;

Article 84 of the Constitution provides that “The President shall not be charged with any criminal offense during his/her service except for the case of insurrection or foreign aggression.” The foregoing provision does not expressly stipulate that the statute of limitations is suspended for any crime except for insurrection or foreign aggression during the period of his/her service. However, the provision on the suspension of the statute of limitations should be deemed a provision on the suspension of the statute of limitations (see Constitutional Court Order 94Hun-Ma246, Jan. 20, 1995; Constitutional Court Order 95Hun-Ma100, Jun. 25, 1998).

In this case, the judgment of the court below that the statute of limitations for each of the crimes was suspended on February 25, 2008 when the defendant assumed office as the President, and was resumed from February 24, 2013 when the defendant retired from office, is justifiable in accordance with the above legal principles. Such judgment of the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to the suspension of the statute of limitations, such as the grounds of appeal

(g) Publication of the suspected facts;

The lower court, on the grounds indicated in its reasoning, determined that the instant indictment cannot be deemed to have been instituted against the suspected facts subject to the crime of publishing the suspected facts committed by a prosecutor, etc., and that, even if such facts are recognized, the procedure of prosecution does not constitute a case where a violation of the provisions of the Act becomes null and void.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal doctrine and the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the publication of suspected facts, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical

2. As to the grounds of appeal on the embezzlement of Nonindicted Company 6

A. The Defendant’s ground of appeal against the actual owner of Nonindicted Company 6

For the reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that the Defendant was a de facto owner of Nonindicted Company 6 in light of various circumstances as indicated in its reasoning, including the Defendant actively involved in the process of incorporation of Nonindicted Company 6, the Defendant was also the actual owner of △△dong land, which is the source of capital increase with capital issued by Nonindicted Company 6, and the Defendant and his children exercised major management rights of Nonindicted Company 6 and carried out management succession to Nonindicted Company 7, and other Nonindicted Company 6’s disposal of and benefit from Nonindicted Company 6’s stocks, and the details of use of Nonindicted Company 6

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal doctrine and the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the degree of proof and the credibility of the statement, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence

B. Embezzlements for raising funds for Nonindicted Company 6

1) Defendant’s ground of appeal

For the reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that Nonindicted 8 and Nonindicted 9 embezzled KRW 24,188,926,949 as Nonindicted Company 6’s funds in collusion with Nonindicted 8 and Nonindicted 9, on the ground that the Defendant’s instruction, raising funds for Nonindicted Company 6 with Nonindicted Company 6 and delivered the funds to Nonindicted 10, and the funds transferred as such were used for the Defendant’s sake by laundrying the funds.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the establishment of accomplices, admissibility and probative value of evidence of statement, and establishment of embezzlement, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence

2) Prosecutor’s ground of appeal

For the reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court acquitted the Defendant on the part of the facts charged, on the ground that there is insufficient proof of the fact that the evidence submitted by the prosecutor alone was embezzled by creating an additional amount of KRW 9,718,648,938.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the degree of proof, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence

C. Defendant’s ground of appeal as to embezzlement of payment of false benefits, embezzlement of purchase of automobiles, and embezzlement of use of corporate cards

For the reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that the Defendant embezzled Nonindicted Company 6’s funds in collusion with Nonindicted Company 8, etc., on the ground that: (a) paid KRW 434,227,847, a sum of KRW 53,950,00 with the Defendant’s funds; (b) registered the said car in the name of the Defendant and delivered it to the Defendant; (c) delivered the Defendant’s card to Nonindicted Company 6 to Nonindicted Company 6, the Defendant used KRW 571,510,60, and paid the said amount with Nonindicted Company 6’s funds; and (d) the Defendant embezzled the said amount in collusion with Nonindicted Company 6.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the probative value of testimony evidence, establishment of embezzlement, and application of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes, or by exceeding the bounds of

D. Defendant’s ground of appeal as to the number of crimes

For the reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court determined that each of the above embezzlement crimes constitutes a single comprehensive crime, on the grounds that: (a) the victim of the above embezzlement crime is the same as Nonindicted Company 6; (b) the victim’s legal interest is single as the property rights of Nonindicted Company 6; and (c) Nonindicted 8 commits a crime of embezzlement of Nonindicted Company 6 on a specific and individual basis in accordance with the Defendant’s general direction; and (d) each of the embezzlement methods is identical and the identity and continuity of the criminal intent can be recognized.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the blanket crime as otherwise in the grounds of appeal

3. As to the grounds of appeal by the prosecutor on Nonindicted Company 6’s evasion of corporate tax

The term “determination of gross income” means that the income subject to taxation is considerably mature (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2003Du797, May 26, 2005). In determining whether any claim under the Corporate Tax Act is to be included in gross income, if there is no legal limitation on the exercise of the claim, the right once becomes final and conclusive and should be included in gross income for the pertinent business year (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Du3328, May 13, 2005).

For the reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court acquitted Nonindicted Company 6 of this part of the charges on this part, on the ground that, regardless of whether Nonindicted Company 6 was aware of damages and of the perpetrator, as it acquired damage liability for each business year to which Nonindicted Company 6’s embezzlement was committed, from 2002 to 2007, each business year to which the crime of embezzlement was committed, the amount equivalent to Nonindicted Company 12’s embezzlement was included in the taxable income of Nonindicted Company 6 each business year, deeming that the amount equivalent to Nonindicted Company 12’s embezzlement was included in the taxable income of Nonindicted Company 6 each business year, and was not included in the taxable income of Nonindicted Company 6 in 2008, it did not constitute corporate tax evasion even if it was not included in the gross income for 2008 business year. On this premise, the lower court rejected the prosecution on this premise, on the ground that there was no accusation by the Commissioner of

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal doctrine, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the principle of confirmation of rights and obligations under the Corporate Tax Act.

4. As to the grounds of appeal by the prosecutor on abuse of authority

“ Abuse of authority” means the exercise of authority by a public official over matters falling under the general authority and authority, and is distinguishable from tort using status where a public official performs an act that does not fall under the general authority and authority. In order for a public official to be deemed a matter falling under the general authority and authority of a public official, legal basis related thereto is required. The statutory basis does not necessarily require the express provision, but is a comprehensive and substantial examination of laws and regulations, and where it is deemed that a public official is deemed to fall under the authority and authority of the relevant public official, and where it is deemed sufficient to cause the other party to perform a non-obligatory act or interfere with rights, it is included in the general authority and authority prescribed in the crime of abuse of authority (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2018Do14303, Aug. 29, 2019). Meanwhile, even if a public official requires a working-level person to assist the performance of his/her duties, this is merely a result of his/her performance of duties, and thus, it does not constitute “when performing his/her duties” 10 days”.

The lower court found the Defendant not guilty of all charges on this part of the facts charged, on the ground that, in light of various circumstances as indicated in its reasoning, such as that the Defendant’s support for Nonindicted Company 6’s lawsuit and Nonindicted Property 10’s order related to inheritance are merely an instruction on private affairs, and that there is no circumstance that the Defendant had exercised general authority and authority over the management of national pending issues, such instruction does not belong to the general authority of the president, and it is difficult to recognize that the Defendant had caused Nonindicted 2

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal doctrine and the record, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the general authority and authority of the crime of abusing authority and obstructing another’s exercise of rights, or by exceeding the bounds of the free evaluation of evidence

5. As to the ground of appeal on △△ Bribery bribe

A. The prosecutor's ground of appeal on the prior acceptance of bribery

For the reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court found the Defendant not guilty of the facts charged around this part and the first preliminary charge on the ground that there is insufficient evidence to prove that the Defendant received a solicitation on October 2007, and that the Defendant did not constitute a prior bribery charge retroactively before the Defendant became a public official after becoming a public official.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the concept of solicitation of prior bribery and the establishment of acceptance of bribe according to the ex post facto recognition and acceptance intent of the recipient, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation

(b) Simple bribery;

1) Defendant’s ground of appeal

A) The part related to the direct remittance of money to the account of ○○○○○○○○○○ (hereinafter “first method”)

For the reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that the Defendant received, as a bribe, economic benefits equivalent to USD 4,250,000 (Korean US$ 5,077,587,500) in total, on the ground that the Defendant received, as a bribe, opportunities and rights to use law services from △△△△△, and at the latest around April 2008, the recognition and acceptance of the first method of acceptance of bribe at the latest.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the concurrence of intent, acquisition and intent of bribery, calculation of the amount of bribe, and time of establishment, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical

나) 공소외 6 회사 미국소송 사건을 수행하는 ☆☆☆☆ ☆☆☆☆ ▽▽ 사무소에서 보낸 청구서에 기재된 금액을 ◇◇◇◇ ◎◎◎◎에서 지급하는 방식(이하 ‘제2방식’이라고 한다) 관련 부분

On the grounds indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that Nonindicted Co. 6 received money corresponding to legal services by the second method, and the Defendant, at the latest around October 27, 2009, on the ground that there was a common perception or understanding on the duty execution subject to solicitation and the fact that money and valuables provided to Nonindicted Co. 6 was paid to Nonindicted Co. 6, a third party upon receiving an illegal solicitation in connection with his duties, and had Nonindicted Co. 6 receive KRW 3,314,936.83 (limited to KRW 3,829,453,343) in total, on the ground that the Defendant received money and valuables provided to Nonindicted Co. 6.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the concurrence of intent, illegal solicitation, and the statement re-specialized in the crime of bribery, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence

2) Prosecutor’s ground of appeal

A) The main charge part

The lower court, on the grounds indicated in its reasoning, acquitted the Defendant on this part of the facts charged, on the ground that the Defendant did not directly accept money from the first and second methods.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the acceptance of bribe or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence

B) Part of the first preliminary charge

For the reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court found the Defendant not guilty of the portion equivalent to USD 250,00 ($ 232,250,000 in total) under the first method and USD 5,280,594.56 in total under the second method ($ 6,268,969,819 in total) among the facts charged, on the ground that there is insufficient evidence to prove that the Defendant, on February 28, 2008, and March 28, 2008, recognized the acceptance of the bribe provided under the first method prior to that on April 2008, or that the other party to whom the bribe was received under the second method, was non-indicted 6 and the receipt of the bribe by the non-indicted 6, and it is difficult to view it as being directly received by social norms.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the classification and judgment criteria of direct acceptance of bribe and third party bribery, and the establishment of acceptance of bribe based on ex post facto recognition and acceptance intent of the recipient, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation

C) Part of the 2 preliminary charges

For the reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court acquitted the Defendant of the portion of the charges that amounting to the sum of USD 250,000 ($ 232,250,000 ($ 232,250,000) and USD 1,965,657.73 ($ 2,439,516,475) under the second method, on October 27, 2009, on the ground that there is insufficient evidence to prove that Nonindicted Company 6 received money from Nonindicted Company 6 on February 28, 2008 and March 28, 2008, or that the Defendant approved Nonindicted Company 6 to receive a bribe in the first manner from the △△ side of △△ by the Defendant from April 2008. < Amended by Act No. 9398, Oct. 27, 2009; Act No. 6539, Jul. 73, 2007>

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the establishment of acceptance of bribe by ex post facto recognition and acceptance intent, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation

6. As to the grounds of appeal on the loss to the National Treasury and acceptance of bribe due to the receipt of funds from the National Intelligence Service (hereinafter “National Staff”)

A. The Prosecutor’s Grounds of Appeal on Non-Indicted. 13’s losses and acceptance of bribe to the National Treasury due to the primary receipts and disbursements of KRW 200 million of the NIS funds

On the grounds indicated in its reasoning, the lower court acquitted the Defendant of all the charges on this part of the charges on the ground that there is insufficient proof that the Defendant received KRW 200 million from Nonindicted 13 on March 2008 or around May 2008, on the ground that there is insufficient evidence to prove that the Defendant received KRW 200

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the record, the lower court did not err in its judgment by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules.

B. Each national treasury loss incurred by Nonindicted 13’s capital 200 million won in the second payment of KRW 200 million and Nonindicted 14’s capital 200 million won in the capital

1) Defendant’s ground of appeal

For the reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that Nonindicted 13 incurred the total amount of KRW 400 million, in collusion with Nonindicted 13 or Nonindicted 14 in order with Nonindicted 13 or Nonindicted 14, on or around April 5, 2008, and around July 8, 2010, Nonindicted 14 provided KRW 200 million of the special project cost at each Defendant’s request, and that Nonindicted 14’s perception of the national treasury loss was recognized.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the interpretation of the elements of a crime of violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation

2) Prosecutor’s ground of appeal

For the reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court determined that the crime of violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (Loss on National Treasury, etc.) caused by embezzlement prescribed aggravated punishment for the crime of embezzlement or occupational embezzlement under the Criminal Act depending on the status of accounting personnel, and that the Defendant was punished for the crime of embezzlement under Article 355(1) of the Criminal Act on the ground that the Defendant did not have the status as a person in charge of accounting personnel or the special project cost

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine as to punishment imposed as otherwise in the grounds of

C. The grounds of appeal by the prosecutor on the acceptance of Nonindicted 13 NIS funds of KRW 200 million and the acceptance of bribe by Nonindicted 14 NIS funds of KRW 200 million

If the receipt of money acquired through a crime of embezzlement does not only include an internal distribution of the money acquired through a crime among co-principals through a public offering, the crime of bribery is not established separately. Whether the given money is deemed a bribe or not should be objectively assessed and determined by comprehensively taking into account the intent of the parties to the receipt and payment of the money, the amount of the received money, the time interval between the crime of embezzlement and the receipt, whether the received money was embezzled, and the place and method of receipt, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2019Do1766, Nov. 28, 2019).

For the reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court acquitted the Defendant of all the charges on this part of the facts charged, on the ground that it is difficult to view this part of the State funds received by the Defendant as a bribe, and it was difficult to deem the Defendant as having intention to commit a bribe, on the ground that it was difficult to deem the funds received by the Defendant as a bribe, and that there was an intention to commit a bribe.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal doctrine and the record, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the establishment of bribery or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules.

D. The Defendant’s ground of appeal on acceptance of bribe due to the number of USD 100,000 U.S. dollars 14

The lower court, on the grounds indicated in its reasoning, determined that the Defendant received USD 100,00 from Nonindicted 14 as a bribe when recognizing the bribe on September 201 through October 10, 201.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules.

7. As to the grounds of appeal on the bribe 15 and the violation of the Political Funds Act

가. ◁◁◁◁◁◁ 회장 선임 관련 뇌물

1) Defendant’s ground of appeal

원심은 판시와 같은 이유를 들어, 피고인은 대통령 취임 전인 2008. 1. 23. 배우자 공소외 16을 통하여 공소외 15로부터 금융기관장 선임 등에 관한 청탁과 함께 1,230만 원 상당의 의류를 수수하고 대통령 취임 후 직무관련성이 인정되는 ◁◁◁◁◁◁ 회장 선임 등에 관여하여 2008. 6. 27. 공소외 15를 ◁◁◁◁◁◁ 회장으로 선임되게 하였다고 보아, 피고인이 담당할 직무에 관한 청탁을 받고 1,230만 원 상당의 뇌물을 수수한 후 부정한 행위를 하였다고 판단하였다.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the relationship to duties, illegal disposal, and probative value of the bribery, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical

2) Prosecutor’s ground of appeal

A) Attached Table 3 of the judgment of the court of first instance (hereinafter “instant list of crimes”) 1 through 8

원심은 판시와 같은 이유를 들어, 피고인은 2007. 8. 20. ▷▷▷당 대통령 후보 경선에서 승리한 이후부터 2008. 2. 25. 대통령으로 취임하기 이전까지의 기간 동안 대통령이 될 자의 지위에 있었으므로 피고인이 그 이전에 이 사건 범죄일람표 순번 1 내지 4 기재와 같이 돈을 수수하였다 하더라도 대통령이 될 자의 지위에서 이를 수수한 것이라고 볼 수 없고, 피고인이 위 범죄일람표 순번 5 내지 8 기재와 같이 공소외 15로부터 청탁을 받고 돈을 수수하였다거나 피고인에게 사전수뢰의 고의가 있었다는 점에 관한 증명이 부족하다고 보아, 이 부분 공소사실을 모두 무죄로 판단하였다.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the subject of the crime of prior bribery and the existence and recognition of solicitation, or by exceeding the bounds of the free evaluation of evidence against

B) Serial 10 of the crime sight table of this case

For the reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court found the Defendant not guilty of this part of the facts charged on the ground that there is insufficient evidence as to the fact that the Defendant conspired with Nonindicted 17 and received KRW 300 million or that the Defendant was the subject of

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the renunciation of conspiracy and conspiracy, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules.

B. Prosecutor’s ground of appeal on violation of the Political Funds Act

For the reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court acquitted all of the charges on the ground that: (a) the Defendant did not constitute political funds; (b) in collusion with Nonindicted 17, the Defendant received KRW 300 million, such as the list No. 10,000, or there is insufficient proof as to the fact that the Defendant was the recipient of money and valuables; and (c) on such premise, the lower court acquitted the Defendant of all of the charges charged. On such premise, the lower court acquitted the Defendant of all of the charges on the violation of the Political Funds Act as stated in the table No. 1 or No. 8 of the crime list No. 9, on the ground that the statute of limitations on the charges of violating the Political Funds Act was already completed prior to the institution

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the concept and scope of political funds, and the renunciation of conspiracy and conspiracy, or by exceeding the bounds of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules.

다. ◁◁◁◁◁◁ 회장 연임 관련 뇌물

1) The Defendant’s ground of appeal as to acceptance of bribe Nos. 11 and 13 of the crime sight table of this case

For the reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that the Defendant received total of KRW 200 million from Nonindicted 15 via Nonindicted 16 as a bribe twice, such as the No. 11 and 13 of the crime sight table in this case.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal doctrine and evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding probative value, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation

2) The Prosecutor’s ground of appeal as to acceptance of bribe Nos. 12 of the crime sight table of this case

For the reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court rendered a not guilty verdict on this part of the facts charged, on the ground that there is insufficient evidence to prove that the Defendant, in collusion with Nonindicted 17, received KRW 100 million from Nonindicted 15, such as the list No. 12 of the instant crimes

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the scope of establishment of joint principal offenders, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence.

8. As to the grounds of appeal on the bribe 18 and the violation of the Political Funds Act

A. The ground of appeal by the prosecutor against the illegal agency after the prior acceptance of the bribe

For the reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court rendered a not guilty verdict on this part of the facts charged, on the ground that there is insufficient proof as to the Defendant’s receipt of Nonindicted Party 18’s solicitation through Nonindicted Party 19 and Nonindicted Party 2, around B or B in 2007.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding implied solicitation of a prior bribery or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules.

B. The Defendant’s ground of appeal as to the illegal company and violation of the Political Funds Act after simple acceptance of the bribe

원심은 판시와 같은 이유를 들어, 피고인이 공소외 2 등과 공모하여, 2007년 가을 내지 초겨울경 공소외 18로부터 정치자금으로 2억 원을 수수하고, 2008. 3.경부터 4.경까지 공소외 18로부터 합계 2억 원을 추가로 수수한 후 그 대가로 직무관련성이 인정되는 ▷▷▷당 비례대표 국회의원 공천과정에 개입하여 2008. 3. 24. 공소외 18을 ▷▷▷당 비례대표 국회의원 ♤번으로 추천되게 하였다고 보아, 피고인이 2억 원의 뇌물을 수수한 후 부정한 행위를 하고 법에 정하지 않은 방법으로 4억 원의 정치자금을 기부받았다고 판단하였다.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the relationship to duties and degree of proof regarding the bribery, or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation

9. As to the grounds of appeal by the prosecutor on each bribe of Nonindicted 20, Nonindicted 21, and Nonindicted 22

For the reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court acquitted Nonindicted 20, Nonindicted 21, and Nonindicted 22 on all the facts charged, on the ground that there is insufficient proof that there was an explicit or implied solicitation against the Defendant at the time of delivering the money to each Nonindicted 2.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding implied solicitation or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules.

10. As to the grounds of appeal by the prosecutor on the violation of the Presidential Records Act

For the reasons indicated in its holding, the court below dismissed this part of the prosecution on the ground that the contents recorded or cited by the prosecutor in the indictment exceed the necessary degree to clarify the specific facts charged and the motive of the defendant's crime, and that the judge may have a judge committed another crime or be involved in such crime, and that the adoption of the evidence may cause the judge to become aware of the contents of the indictment without the procedure for adopting evidence, etc., thereby hindering the judge's understanding of the substance and the exercise of the defendant's right to defense, and that there was a valid objection against the violation of the principle of an indictment only.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the principle of an indictment only or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation

11. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Chief Justice Park Sang-ok

Justices Noh Jeong-chul

Justices Kim In-bok