The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The court below acknowledged the fact that the KAF School established a shooting range from around 1951 to around March 1986 on the forest of this case and its neighboring forest, and constructed four buildings, such as lecture rooms, administrative team rooms, and practice rooms, on the ground of the forest of this case, and additionally established a training ground for the students living together. The forest of this case is located far away from the housing of this case, and even after closure of the shooting range adjacent to the housing of this case around March 27, 1989, the court below held that the military of this case did not extinguish the forest of this case until March 27, 1989, according to the records, it did not err in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the rules of evidence and incomplete deliberation, and there was no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the rules of evidence.

(2) Judgment on the first ground for appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the plaintiff's assertion that since the expiry date of the requisition compensation securities concerning the forest of this case was August 31, 1986 and the military needs concerning the forest of this case were extinguished within five years before the expiration date of the above redemption or within five years after the expiration date of the redemption, the right to repurchase under Article 20 of the Act on Special Measures for Readjustment of Requisition can be exercised against the plaintiff's previous co-ownership in the forest of this case. The expiration date of redemption stipulated in Article 20 of the above Act is reasonable to view the last redemption date, i.e., the date on which the requisitioned was able to receive the last redemption, not the date on which the requisitioned was actually repaid, but the last redemption date, i.e., the date on which the defendant received the redemption from the plaintiff with other co-owners of the forest of this case, and the date on which the redemption was commenced from September 12, 197 to the 198th 198th 19.

According to the former part of Article 20(1) of the Special Measures Act, "the date when redemption of the securities paid with the purchase price of the requisitioned property purchased under this Act is terminated or within five years from the end of the redemption thereof is terminated, the person requisitioned or his heir may purchase the securities first, if all or part of the pertinent property becomes unnecessary for military purposes," and "the date when redemption of the securities is terminated" in this context refers to the date when the holder of the securities subject to requisition finally presents the securities and actually receives the redemption, thereby practically terminating the redemption of the securities subject to requisition. It does not mean the date when the last redemption is made possible, but it is difficult to avoid criticism that the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the requirements for the exercise of the repurchase right under Article 20(1) of the Special Measures Act.

However, as legally determined by the court below in the instant case, if the military necessity for the instant forest was not extinguished at least until March 27, 1987, the plaintiff exercising a right to repurchase under the aforementioned special measures should at least assert and prove that the total amount of redemption of the instant forest land was actually paid to the plaintiff within five years retroactively from March 27, 1987 (hereinafter “the instant securities”). According to the records, the plaintiff asserted that the date on which redemption of the instant securities was terminated is August 31, 1986, and Eul evidence No. 4 stated that the expiry date of redemption of the instant securities was also August 31, 1986. However, the court below's first instance court's determination on the fact-finding of the Bank of Korea Chapter No. 4 cannot be found to be erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the date on which redemption was completed within 38 days from the date on which redemption was completed, and thus, it cannot be found that the date of completion was 184 days from the date on which redemption was completed.

(3) Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Final Young-young (Presiding Justice)