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(영문) 청주지방법원 2018.05.04 2018나5554

손해배상(기)

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1. All appeals filed by the plaintiffs are dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiffs.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

Reasons

1. The grounds for this part of the parties' assertion are as follows: (a) the second 19 of the judgment of the court of first instance added "after November 4, 2008," or (b) the second 19 of the judgment of the court of first instance, or at least on December 3, 2008, of which the decision of the previous committee was notified, as stated in the corresponding part (second 6 to 3 pages 1 of the second 6). Therefore, this part is cited pursuant to the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure

2. Determination

A. The extinctive prescription of the right to claim damages against a State that caused tort expires unless it is exercised for five years from the date of the tort (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da202819, May 16, 201); and the fact that the deceased died on July 7, 1950 after being enacted by Law No. 217, Sept. 24, 1951 (see, e.g., Article 32 of the former Accounting Act before repealed by Law No. 217), and the Framework Act on the Settlement of History for Truth and Reconciliation (hereinafter “The Act”), even in cases where the determination was made to confirm that the deceased was a victim of a sacrifice before and after the Korean War, the extinctive prescription of the right to claim damages has already expired at the time five years after the date of the occurrence of damage to the who made the sacrifice (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da202819, May 16, 1950).

B. The plaintiffs asserted that the defendant's claim for the completion of extinctive prescription is abuse of rights.

On the other hand, the exercise of the right of defense on the ground of extinctive prescription is governed by the principle of good faith and the principle of prohibition of abuse of rights, which are the major principle of the civil law, so if the debtor had shown the same attitude that he did not invoke the prescription after the completion of extinctive prescription, and if he had exercised the right within a considerable period of time that he could expect the exercise of the right thereafter.