[However, even with respect to each real estate listed in [Attachment 4] and [5] List 4, the Plaintiff asserted that the real estate was occupied from March 27, 1992, but it is reasonable to deem that the Plaintiff occupied the real estate from February 2, 1995 when the registration of ownership transfer was completed in the name of the title trustee B and Defendant C, so the starting date of possession is recognized as February 2, 1995, and the expiration date of the acquisition by prescription is recognized as February 2, 2015. The starting date of possession, which is the basis for calculating the acquisition period, is only an indirect fact that is indirect and means to determine the acquisition period, which is the requirement for the acquisition by prescription, and thus, it cannot be said that the Plaintiff recognized it differently from the allegations of the parties, and thus, it cannot be said that the lawsuit against D was withdrawn (see Supreme Court Decision 86Meu1625, Feb. 24, 1987).

2.(a)

Claim against Defendant 25: Judgment by public notice (Article 208(3)3 of the Civil Procedure Act)

B. Claim against the remaining Defendants: Judgment on deemed confession (Article 208(3)2 of the Civil Procedure Act)