The plaintiff shall pay to the plaintiff the amount of 364,321,641 won, the amount of 189,265,091 won, the amount of 175,056,548 won, and the amount of 5% per annum from April 1, 1999 to September 1, 2004, and the amount of 20% per annum from the next day to the day of full payment.

2. All remaining appeals by the Defendants and the Plaintiff are dismissed.

3. 1/2 of the total costs of litigation shall be borne by the Plaintiff, and the remainder 1/2 by the Defendants, respectively.

The Defendants jointly and severally pay to the Plaintiff the amount of KRW 740,092,232 with 5% per annum from April 1, 1999 to the service date of a copy of the complaint of this case, and 25% per annum from the next day to the day of complete payment.

2. The plaintiff's purport of appeal

The part of the judgment of the court of first instance against the plaintiff shall be revoked. The defendants jointly and severally pay to the plaintiff 233,509,954 won with 5% interest per annum from April 1, 1999 to the service date of the copy of the complaint of this case, and 25% interest per annum from the next day to the day of complete payment.

3. Purport of the defendants' appeal

The part of the judgment of the court of first instance against the Defendants shall be revoked, and the plaintiff's claim corresponding to the above revocation shall be dismissed.

1. Facts of recognition;

The following facts are not disputed between the parties, or evidence Nos. 1, 2-1 through 3, Gap evidence No. 8-1, Gap evidence No. 9, 10-1, 2, Gap evidence No. 11-1 through 5, Gap evidence No. 12-13, Eul evidence No. 14-1, 2, Eul evidence No. 15-1 (the same as Eul No. 10-1), 2 (the same as Eul No. 1-2), 3, 4 (the same as Eul evidence No. 10-2), 5 (the same as Eul evidence No. 1-1), Gap evidence No. 2, 16-1, 4, Gap evidence No. 17, 17-17, 14, Gap evidence No. 14-2, 2-1, 3-1, 5-2, 5-1, 5-2, 5-1, 5-2, 5-1, 2-1, 3

A. Status of the parties

The plaintiff is a small and medium enterprise with the purpose of manufacturing and selling automobile glass and parts, and the main business of selling safe glass among the parts of automobile produced by the defendant Young Automobile Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "the defendant Young Automobile"), and the defendant Young Automobile Co., Ltd. is a large enterprise with the purpose of manufacturing and selling various automobiles and parts, and the defendant Geum River High Chemical Co., Ltd. (the trade name before the alteration is referred to as the "Seoul High School Co., Ltd."; hereinafter referred to as the " defendant Geum River"), as an enterprise with the purpose of manufacturing, manufacturing and selling building materials, manufacturing and selling safe glass products, etc. The Korean Safety Heavy Co., Ltd. is a company with exclusive production of safe glass products in Korea. The Korean Co., Ltd. was merged with the defendant Young River Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the "Korean Co., Ltd.") on Aug. 31, 200 and succeeded to its rights and duties (hereinafter referred to as the "the above merger is referred to as the "Defendant Young River Co., Ltd., Ltd.").

B. A contract on the transaction of parts between the Defendant glass producer and the Defendant HA car

On January 1, 1990, Defendant glass manufacturers entered into a basic agreement on automobile transaction (a separate supply agreement was entered into with respect to automobile parts for repairs; hereinafter referred to as “part transaction agreement”) separately with Defendant Malaysia, and each of the above parts transaction agreements has been renewed every year since they manufactured safety glass and automobile safety glass for assembly using the OEM method, and supplied them to Defendant Malaysia. As to the safety glass of automobile in this case, each of the above parts transaction agreements has been amended every year. As to the safety glass of automobile in the instant case, each of the instant automobile was supplied to the Plaintiff on July 4, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as “SU”). < Amended by Presidential Decree No. 15183, Mar. 7, 1996; Presidential Decree No. 15083, Jun. 30, 1999>

On the other hand, according to each of the above parts transaction contracts, the Defendant glass producer should supply the safety glass of the above automobile for repair to Defendant HA car only, and the safety glass of the above automobile for repair can not be provided or sold to a third party without prior consent by Defendant HA car document.

C. Characteristics of goods and Plaintiff’s monopoly sales contract

(1) Characteristics of the product

Goods at issue in this case are automobile safety glass (A/S) for repair (hereinafter referred to as “repair”) with a trademark registered by KIA No. 32414, and the supply of net goods is important for the safety of consumers due to their characteristics, and separate containers for logistics are required due to the high rate of damage in handling, and the expertise of packing is required. Unlike ordinary vehicle parts, motor vehicle manufacturers are supplied through a special contract without directly supplying them.

(2) The Plaintiff’s monopoly sales contract

In the previous case, Defendant 1 supplied each of the above free trade agreements to Defendant 2, which is not an exclusive sales store of Defendant 1, through a small-scale sales store, but an exclusive sales store of Defendant 1, but a small-scale sales store of Defendant 1, which is not an exclusive sales store. However, the Plaintiff concluded a contract with Defendant 2 with Defendant 1 on July 14, 1992 for the supply of free trade agreements with Defendant 1, which is not an exclusive sales store of Defendant 2, and thus, concluded a contract with Defendant 1, which is not an exclusive sales store of Defendant 1, with Defendant 2, and thus, it is not an exclusive sales store of Defendant 1, with Defendant 1, which is not an exclusive sales store of 4,000, with Defendant 1’s separate sales store of 5, and thus, the Plaintiff continued to be supplied with free trade agreement with the Plaintiff on January 19, 199, by means of an automatic sales store agreement with Defendant 1, 194.

D. Infringement of the exclusive sales right by Defendant glass manufacturers

The Defendant glass producer, prior to the conclusion of the contract with the Defendant HA car, has set up their own agency network in front of the price competitiveness as a favorable manufacturer for repair prior to the conclusion of the contract with the Defendant HA car, has occupied the free supply market for repair with the Plaintiff. Even after the conclusion of the contract with the Defendant HA car, the Defendant continued to distribute the automobile safety glass for repair in violation of the contract, despite the agreement to prevent the sale of the automobile safety glass for repair at the time without prior consent of the Defendant RA car in advance.

However, after the Rovis granted the Plaintiff the exclusive right to sell the city, Defendant 1 also requested the Plaintiff to suspend the city outflow on several occasions in order to establish a distribution order through the Plaintiff. However, the said free producers continued to use the city outflow without accepting the request on the grounds that the granting of exclusive right to sell the Plaintiff’s stock management is difficult, and their pre-existing agents may bring about an action against the Plaintiff. From March 28, 1996 to March 28, 1996, the Plaintiff submitted each written statement to suspend the city outflow from July 1, 1996 to the prosecution, and suspended the indictment. From July 7, 1996 to June 197, 197, the said free producers were supplied the Plaintiff with the normal supply of the city outflow from the Defendant’s free producers without favorable treatment to those other than the Plaintiff.

E. Suspension of supply by the Defendants and the Plaintiff’s lawsuit

From July 12, 1997, the Defendant’s glass producer unilaterally suspended the Plaintiff’s supply of glass for the repair of the Plaintiff’s automobile, and the Plaintiff did not supply glass for the repair of the Plaintiff. On August 4, 1997, the Plaintiff suffered damages of 2 billion won due to the Plaintiff’s outflow of the glass for the repair between 1993 and 6.00, and the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit for damages claim (Seoul Central District Court 97Gahap57615) against the Plaintiff on August 23, 1997. The Defendant Kugdong chemical sent the Plaintiff around 197 the Plaintiff’s warning to the Plaintiff on August 197, 197 that the Plaintiff would not sell the Plaintiff’s automobile for the reason that the Plaintiff’s automobile was sold on August 25, 1997. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s warning to the Plaintiff on October 197, 197.

Afterward, on May 28, 1998, the plaintiff notified the plaintiff of the termination of the contract on July 30, 1998, and the plaintiff applied for provisional injunction against the conclusion of the contract with the Suwon District Court on August 3, 1998, and the above court's ruling citing the plaintiff's application (the provisional injunction against the conclusion of the contract with the Suwon District Court 98Kahap903, Oct. 10, 1998) will not delay termination of the contract. Such exclusive sale contract between the plaintiff and ASEAN was terminated on February 27, 199 (the above provisional injunction against the conclusion of the contract with the defendant 299, Feb. 29, 199) and the above provisional injunction against the plaintiff on July 30, 198 (the above provisional injunction against the expiration of the contract with the plaintiff 1, 299, which was stated on the expiration date of the contract with the plaintiff 29, the plaintiff's original sale contract with the defendant 292, as stated on July 2329, 19, respectively.

2. Occurrence of liability for damages;

A. Determination on the cause of the claim

(1) Defendant Malaysia

According to the above facts of recognition, from July 12, 1997 when the supply of free goods for repair was interrupted, Defendant Malaysia failed to supply favorable goods to the Plaintiff from July 12, 1997 to February 27, 1999 when the exclusive sales contract with the Plaintiff was terminated, thereby failing to perform its obligation under the above exclusive sales contract.

(2) Defendant glass producers

Generally, the exclusive effect of claims is denied, and a claim by a third party is allowed between creditors and creditors and a third party, and thus, it does not immediately constitute tort. However, the principle of free competition in a transaction is premised on fair and sound competition within the extent permitted by law and order. Thus, if a third party knowingly infringes on creditors’ interests by violating laws and regulations, such as violating good morals or social order, even though it is aware that it harms creditors, if the third party knowingly infringes on creditors’ interests, then it does not constitute tort. Here, the illegality of the infringement on claims should be determined individually by comprehensively taking into account the content of the claims infringed, the form of the infringement, the intent of the infringer, and the existence of the year. The need to guarantee freedom of trade, the public interest including economic and social policy factors, and the balance of interests between the parties should be considered.

According to the above facts, the plaintiff acquired the exclusive right to sell the glass for the use of remuneration through the exclusive sales contract with the plaintiff, and the defendant glass producer supplied the glass for the use of remuneration only to the plaintiff by means of the parts transaction contract. Accordingly, the contract system has been formed so that the plaintiff can supply the glass for the use of the car manufactured by the above glass producer only to the plaintiff and sell only to the plaintiff through the plaintiff. The defendant glass producer, who was well aware of these circumstances as the party to the contract system, was suspended from the supply of the glass for the use of the plaintiff's automobile for the purpose of excluding the plaintiff who was well aware of such circumstances from the distribution network for the use of the plaintiff's complaint and lawsuit, etc., and since the above acts by the defendant glass producer are deemed to be illegal acts detrimental to the fairness and soundness of the transaction in light of the above criteria, the defendant glass producer is liable to compensate for damages suffered by the plaintiff.

(3) Furthermore, the Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants jointly and severally liable to compensate the Plaintiff for damages incurred to the Plaintiff, on the grounds that the Plaintiff and the Defendant glass producers jointly engaged in the discontinuance of supply as above, thereby causing damage to the Plaintiff.

First, it is insufficient to acknowledge that the above Defendants jointly committed an act of suspending the supply of evidence 8, 9, 29-1, 4, and 23 through 25 with regard to the relationship between the acts of the Defendant glass producers, as stated in the evidence Nos. 5, 6-23-3 (C), and No. 8, 25-9, and No. 29-1, 29-29, and No. 23 through No. 25, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge that the above Defendants jointly committed an act of suspending the supply of evidence (the above Defendants’ tort cannot be deemed as a combination of one damage). Accordingly, each act of the Defendants glass producers should be deemed as a separate tort against the Plaintiff and the damages therefrom should be deemed as separate damages. Thus, Defendant Geumgang-gum chemical and Korea Scatt are liable only for the damages they incurred to each Plaintiff.

Next, in a case where the relationship between the damage liability and the damage liability of the defendant's car with the damage liability of the defendant's car, the damage liability due to the debtor's non-performance of obligation, and the damage liability due to the tort committed by the third party is based on the same factual basis, it is deemed that the joint and several liability relationship exists (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da22446 delivered on November 11, 1994), and the defendant's glass producer is liable to compensate for the damage of the defendant's car and the plaintiff to the extent that they are liable respectively.

Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion that the Defendants are jointly and severally liable to compensate the Plaintiff for the total damages incurred by the Plaintiff, as the Defendants jointly and severally committed an act of discontinuance of supply, is justifiable only to the extent that the vicarious joint and several liability

B. Determination as to the defendants' assertion

(1) Although Defendant Malaysia asserts that the contractual relationship with itself and the Defendant glass producer and the Plaintiff are not the resale relationship, but the relationship between the Defendant glass producer and the Plaintiff permit the Defendant glass producer to attach the trademark on the glass for the use of remuneration directly supplied to the Plaintiff, and only collect the fee therefor. However, the fact that the Plaintiff entered into each part transaction contract with the Defendant glass producer, each part transaction contract with the Plaintiff, and the exclusive sale contract with the Plaintiff, and the fact that the favorable for the use of remuneration was transacted based on this contract is as seen earlier, the above argument is without

In addition, at the time of concluding the exclusive sale contract, the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff’s intent to recognize the duty to supply the Plaintiff with respect to the Plaintiff on the premise that the Defendant glass manufacturers provided the glass for the use of remuneration. Since the subject matter of the contract is the limited kind of product that the Defendant glass producers manufacture and supply, the obligation to supply the Plaintiff with respect to the free supply of the Plaintiff on the Babl and Babl, or that the subject matter of the contract is a limited kind of product as alleged above, there is no evidence to acknowledge that the transaction object of the contract is a limited kind of product as alleged above.

Defendant 1: (a) the failure of the Plaintiff to perform his obligation is due to the instant glass producer’s unilateral suspension of the supply; (b) the Plaintiff cannot supply it to the Plaintiff unless he is provided with favorable remuneration from the said glass producer in the exclusive status; and (c) the suspension of the supply of Defendant 1’s glass producer is due to the circumstance that the Plaintiff cannot be responsible for the Plaintiff, such as filing the Plaintiff’s complaint and filing a lawsuit; and (d) the Plaintiff’s non-performance of the duty of cooperation under the good faith principle, such as the Plaintiff’s non-performance of the duty of cooperation; (b) the Plaintiff’s non-performance of the duty of cooperation under the good faith principle, such failure to perform the duty of cooperation; (c) however, the Defendant 1, 2, and 18 through 23, 25 through 27, and 1, 4, 1-1, 1-2, and 6-1 of the evidence No. 1, 1-2, and 6-1 of the Plaintiff’s free trade producer.

(2) The defendant Geum River-Wol chemical and the Korean Scurt did not supply the glass for the repair of the defendant Malaysia because their financial situation is considerably difficult due to the impossibility of the default agreement, etc., and their normal business is difficult, it is the measure lawfully conducted pursuant to Article 35 subparagraph 1 or 3 or Article 36 of the Basic Contract for Non-Standard Business Types of Motor Vehicles concluded between the two. Therefore, it is argued that the plaintiff did not constitute tort against the plaintiff. Thus, there is no dispute between the parties as to the fact that the non-payment deferment agreement was the object of the non-payment deferment agreement, but even during the suspension period of the supply, there is no difference between the parties. According to the above evidence, it is acknowledged that the non-payment glass producer did not supply the glass for the repair of the defendant Malaysia. The defendants' assertion that the supply of the above evidence was suspended through the above legitimate procedure since the financial situation of the defendant Hadrgrtrtrtrrt did not clearly make it difficult to do so, and there is no reason to recognize the above evidence.

(3) The Defendants: (a) committed an act under Article 15 subparag. 1 (Cancellation of Contracts) and subparag. 5 (when the Plaintiff intentionally delays payment, delays in the provision of a security requested by the Plaintiff), 6 (when the Plaintiff’s sales performance is determined to be considerably lacking), 7 (when the Plaintiff intentionally or negligently damaged the credit of the Plaintiff), 8 (where the Plaintiff intentionally or negligently caused an obstacle to the business of the Plaintiff, or damages caused by the Plaintiff’s intentional act or negligence); and (b) committed an act under Article 15 subparag. 1 (Cancellation of Contracts), 5 (when the Plaintiff intentionally or negligently violated the fiduciary relationship), 6 (where the Plaintiff’s sales performance is determined to be considerably lacking), 7 (where the Plaintiff damaged the credit of the Plaintiff), 197) and 19 (where the Plaintiff caused an impediment to the business of the Plaintiff’s license or damages caused by the Plaintiff’s intentional act against the Defendant glass producer; and (c) on May 28, 1998, the said agreement was destroyed by the Plaintiff’s assertion of the trust relationship with the Plaintiff on July 30, 1997).

3. Scope of damages.

(a) Contents and calculation of the loss;

(1) In light of the circumstances leading up to the discontinuance of the supply of the glass for remuneration by the Defendants, the Plaintiff’s amount of damages is the sum of lost profit due to the discontinuance of the supply by Defendant Young Automobile and Defendant glass producer; the profit that the Plaintiff would have accrued if the supply had not been discontinued during the period from the suspension of the supply to the termination of the exclusive sales contract; and the expenses incurred by the Plaintiff for the normal maintenance and management of the sales place for a considerable period of time, knowing the discontinuance of the supply from the suspension of the supply to the termination of the exclusive sales contract.

(2) First, considering the scope of lost profits, corporate profits or losses are calculated by comprehensively reflecting various revenue factors and expenditure factors, and the Plaintiff’s lost profits are proportional to the large amount of glass that the Defendant glass producer supplied respectively, the Plaintiff’s lost profits per se due to the suspension of the supply of favorable for remuneration by Defendant glass producer, etc. during the period during which the supply was normally made (from July 1996 to June 197) and the difference between the average monthly sales amount during the period during which the supply was discontinued and the average monthly sales amount during which the supply was ordinarily made, the Plaintiff should calculate the average profit rate based on gross profit. However, the Plaintiff’s average profit rate should be calculated based on the average profit rate (based on the net profit per hour; the Plaintiff’s gross profit cannot be deemed as the profit earned by the Plaintiff, and the above assertion is without merit) by multiplying the monthly average profit per day by the average profit per day during which the Plaintiff’s average profit for the period during which the supply was interrupted, and the profit per day for each of the Defendant glass producer should be calculated by multiplying the average profit for the period during which the supply was supplied to the Plaintiff.

Gap evidence 52 8 through 13, Gap evidence 53 through 7, Gap 54-2 through 13, Gap 5-2 5- 2, Gap 73-1 through 11, Gap 74-1 through 75 - 37 - 97 - 74 - 97 - 97 - 17 - 97 - 37 - 97 - 16 - defendant's average supply period of 5 - 97 - 7 - 97 - 17 - 5 ; 36 - 97 - 5 ; 97 ; 196 - 7 ; 196 - 37 - 97 ; 197 - 5 ;

(3) Next, in light of the circumstances surrounding the interpretation and operation of the exclusive sales contract of this case between the Plaintiff and the Defendants as seen earlier, and the circumstances where Defendant glass producer voluntarily suspended the supply of favorable for remuneration to the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit claiming large damages against the said Defendants against the Plaintiff, etc., the Plaintiff, who did not actually engage in other business activities than the sale of favorable for remuneration, appears to have discontinued the above business or changed the type of business by sufficiently predicting the circumstances where it is difficult to continue the supply of favorable for remuneration, and thus, it is reasonable to view that the Plaintiff, other than the sale of favorable for remuneration of this case, should have discontinued the above business until an appropriate time after the suspension of the supply of favorable for remuneration of this case, cannot be deemed as compensation for the entire costs incurred by the Plaintiff for the maintenance and management of the sales place.

Meanwhile, as recognized by the statements in Gap evidence 52-8 to 13, Gap evidence 53-2 to 8, and Gap evidence 72, the following circumstances are as follows, namely, the plaintiff's sales price of the goods on July 1997 is KRW 322,958,160, and the purchase price of the goods on the basis is KRW 236,850,210, and the month is deemed to have been normally sold without any difference between the previous and the previous. The plaintiff's glass sales place for remuneration is a small number of employees converted into the original representative director's personal business place. The plaintiff's employee's dismissal is a small number of employees converted into the original representative director's personal business place (Article 32 (1) of the Labor Standards Act), and the period of suspension should be deemed to have been calculated at least 30 days prior to the date of dismissal (Article 32 (1) of the Labor Standards Act). In light of the fact that the plaintiff's ordinary sales loss occurred after the implementation of public works and Chapter 97 (297.7).

Furthermore, comprehensively taking account of the overall purport of the arguments in the statement No. 53-9, 10 of the evidence No. 53-9 and 10, it is recognized that the total amount of the ordinary sales and general management disbursed by the Plaintiff between the two months of August 1997 and September 1997 = 87,431,318 won [[(94,463,769 won - 50,366,80 won] + 43,34,349 won; advertising expenses of KRW 50,366,800 disbursed in August 197 after the discontinuance of supply by the Defendants are not included in the ordinary sales and general management expenses; thus, if this is divided in proportion to the amount of each charge owed by the Defendant glass producers, it is difficult to view that the advertising expenses of KRW 50,36,800 paid in August 1, 1997 are included in the ordinary sales and general management expenses.]

(4) If so, the Plaintiff’s losses due to the discontinuance of supply by the Defendants amounted to KRW 404,801,824 ( = 317,370,506 + KRW 87,431,318) and the amount of each of the Defendant’s glass producers’ respective shares is KRW 210,294,546 ( = 164,873,977 + + KRW 45,420,569) and Defendant’s Republic of Korea’s Catt KRW 194,507,276 ( = 152,496,528 + + 42,010,748).

(b) Set-off of negligence;

Meanwhile, in light of the following circumstances acknowledged by the aforementioned facts or the aforementioned evidence, i.e., the Plaintiff’s lawsuit seeking large damages against the Defendant glass producer on August 4, 1997, immediately after the suspension of the supply of glass, the supply of long-term glass has been continuously interrupted until the expiration of the exclusive sales contract until the relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendants becomes worse due to extreme response methods against the Plaintiff’s Defendant, and the exclusive sales contract has been terminated, and even during the suspension period of the supply, the Plaintiff did not actively endeavor to prevent or reduce the damage by faithfully consulting with the Defendants, even during the suspension period of the supply. In light of the above circumstances, the Plaintiff’s error also led to some causes for the occurrence and expansion of the damage of this case, and thus, it shall be considered in calculating the amount of damages by the Defendants, but the ratio shall be determined at 10% of the damage in consideration of all the circumstances revealed in the argument of this case.

C. Sub-decision

Therefore, the Plaintiff is obligated to pay the Plaintiff the amount of KRW 364,321,641 ( = 404,801,824 x 90%) from April 1, 1999 to September 1, 2004, when the Defendants raised a claim against the Defendant and each of the above amounts, KRW 189,265,091 ( = 210,294,546 x 90%) from among the above amounts, and KRW 175,056,548 ( = 194,507,276 x 90%) from the date of repayment of each of the above amounts, or after the date of tort, to pay damages for delay at the rate of 5% per annum from the day following the date of the judgment of the court of first instance, until September 1, 204, which is the date of full payment of the above amounts.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is justified within the scope of the above recognition and the remaining claims are dismissed for lack of grounds. Since the part against the defendants in the judgment of the court of first instance which has concluded a different conclusion is unfair, the part against the defendants in excess of the part against the defendants ordering payment is revoked and the plaintiff's claim corresponding to the above revoked part is dismissed. The remaining appeal of the defendants and the plaintiff's appeal

Judges Park Poe-young (Presiding Judge)