A. The sentencing of the lower court’s unfair sentencing (14 years of imprisonment) on the Defendant’s instant case is unreasonable as it is too unfortunate.

B. It is unreasonable to dismiss the request for the attachment order of this case, even though the defendant and the person who requested the attachment order (hereinafter “the defendant”) are likely to recommit the murder crime, as to the case of the request for attachment order.

2. Determination

A. The determination of an unfair assertion of sentencing on the defendant's case is based on the statutory penalty, and the discretionary determination is made within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act, based on the statutory penalty. In our criminal litigation law that takes the principle of court-oriented and direct care, there is a unique area for the determination of sentencing under Article 1.

In addition to these circumstances and the appellate court’s ex post facto in-depth nature, it is reasonable to respect the sentencing in the event that there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion. Although the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to refrain from rendering a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court’s view (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015) by destroying the first instance judgment solely on the ground that the sentence of the first instance falls within the scope of discretion, but is somewhat different from the appellate court’s opinion (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). The lower court sentenced the above sentence to the Defendant on the ground that the Defendant committed a crime by killing two children, thereby, committed an infringement of the life of the victims, and thus, sent the Defendant’s life at the age of 10 months and 5 years, even after marriage.