2. Determination

A. In light of the fact that the sentencing based on the statutory penalty is a discretionary judgment that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope by comprehensively taking into account the matters that are the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act based on the statutory penalty, and the fact that the sentencing of the first instance court does not change the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and that the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect it. Although the first instance court’s sentencing falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to reverse the judgment of the first instance court and to refrain from imposing a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court’s opinion on

(see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). (B)

As to the instant case, there is no change in the sentencing conditions compared with the original judgment because the prosecutor failed to submit new sentencing data, and the reason for unfair sentencing alleged by the prosecutor appears to be the circumstances that have already been considered in determining the punishment in the lower court, and considering all the sentencing conditions as shown in the instant pleadings, including the Defendant’s age, character and conduct, environment, criminal records, the developments and motives leading to each of the instant crimes, and the circumstances before and after the instant crime, it is difficult for the lower court to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion on the ground that the prosecutor’s assertion is without merit.

3. In conclusion, the prosecutor's appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

However, in the application of the law of the court below, the "Article 37 (1) 2 and Article 50 of the Criminal Act" in the first sentence of the judgment of the court below is obvious that it is a clerical error in writing within the scope of the sum total of the amounts under the former part of Article 37, Articles 38 (1) 2 and 50 of the Criminal Act.