Criminal facts have to be proved to the extent that there is no reasonable doubt (Article 307(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act), but the recognition of facts, the selection and evaluation of evidence, and the selection and evaluation thereof are within the discretionary power of the fact-finding court unless they go beyond the bounds of the principle of free conviction (Article 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act). The lower court determined that the attempted quasi-rape of this case was guilty, and rejected the Defendant’s assertion disputing this.

The allegation in the grounds of appeal is merely a dispute over the recognition of facts belonging to the lower court’s exclusive authority, the selection of evidence, and evaluation. Furthermore, even when examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal doctrine and the duly admitted evidence, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the intent to commit rape or the status of non-competence.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.