1. As for the assertion regarding the non-committee agreement, a specific right to claim the payment of wages or retirement allowances already occurred is transferred to the worker’s private property area and is entrusted to the worker’s disposition, so insofar as a trade union does not obtain an individual consent or authorization from the worker, it cannot perform an act such as waiver or payment, solely with the collective agreement between the employer and the employer (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da76317, Jan. 28, 2010).

For reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that the Defendant’s trade union, which became a member of the Plaintiff (designated parties; hereinafter referred to as the “Plaintiffs, etc.”) and the designated parties (hereinafter referred to as the “Plaintiffs, etc.”) concluded the wage agreement in 2011 with the Defendant, and concluded the wage agreement in 201 with the Defendant that “the wages and various allowances that were paid before this agreement shall not be raised by mutual agreement between the union and the company,” but it cannot be deemed that the said agreement was made without individual consent or authorization of the Plaintiff, etc., and thus, it cannot be deemed that it was effective against the Plaintiff, etc.

Examining the above legal principles and records, the lower court’s aforementioned determination is justifiable. In so doing, it did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules.

2. On the assertion that night work allowance and life-saving bonus should be included in the comparative wage, the lower court determined that the monthly night work allowance paid to the Plaintiff et al. falls under “wages other than wages paid for the prescribed working hours” under the Minimum Wage Act, which are the premise of night work, and that the paid night work allowance paid to the Plaintiff et al. falls under “wages other than wages paid for the prescribed working hours” as the premise of night work, and that the paid life-saving bonus paid to the Plaintiff et al. cannot be deemed to fall under the comparative wage because it is difficult to view it as “wages paid at least once every month” included in the minimum wage. Examining the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court’s aforementioned determination is justifiable. In so doing,

3. As to the assertion on contractual work hours

(1) The court below determined that the working hours of the plaintiff et al. for calculating the minimum wage should be based on 220 hours per month, on the grounds that the plaintiff et al., divided into the morning and the P., conducted day duty and night duty in the form of 12 hours, calculated monthly work hours based on 25 days near the 30th day of the month, and the wage agreement of this case, which applies between the defendant and the defendant's trade union, determined basic wages as wages calculated on the basis of 220 hours per month, and the basic wages are calculated by multiplying the 220 hours per month by the 220 hours of work in each supplementary agreement of this case, and Article 4 of the wage agreement of this case does not regulate the current working hours (12 hours comparison) in the supplementary agreement of 204.

(2) However, it is difficult to accept the above determination by the lower court.

Article 5(1)2 and 3 of the Enforcement Decree of the Minimum Wage Act provides that the amount calculated by dividing the wages paid on a weekly or monthly basis by the “number of contractual work hours per week or month” shall be the wage per hour. However, as the so-called weekly holiday allowance, which is the wage for paid holidays paid on a weekly or monthly basis, is regularly paid not less than once a month for the prescribed work, the comparable wage shall be added in calculating the comparable wage. In addition, in calculating the weekly holiday allowance as the wage for the hours of other allowances paid on a weekly or monthly basis in addition to the weekly holiday allowance, the weekly holiday allowance shall be added in calculating the comparable wage. In calculating the weekly holiday allowance as the wage for the hours, the “regular work hours per week or month” referred to in Article 2(1)7 of the Labor Standards Act refers to the work hours as prescribed in Article 6(2)3 and 4 of the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act, this cannot be the same as the “number of hours for calculating the ordinary wage per week or month (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da64656, Jan. 246, 2007).

The judgment of the court below as above is based on the main ground that Article 13 of the wage agreement of this case provides for the calculation of base pay based on work hours of 220 hours a month. However, as the aforementioned basic pay includes weekly holiday allowances, it is considered 20 hours a month as well as the hours related to weekly holiday allowances in addition to contractual work hours, so if it is based on the above legal principles, it cannot be deemed as the monthly contractual work hours a basis for the calculation of basic pay.

Rather, Article 2(1)7 of the Labor Standards Act defines “fixed working hours” as “fixed working hours between workers and employers,” and according to the record, the Defendant and the Defendant’s trade union clearly determines that working hours shall be based on 7 hours, 20 minutes, and 44 hours per week, excluding hours of recess, through Article 4 of the wage agreement of this case. Thus, the monthly working hours for calculating the minimum wage amount should be calculated based on 44 hours per week pursuant to the above agreement.

(3) Nevertheless, the lower court, on the grounds indicated in its reasoning, calculated based on 220 hours per month, which served as the basis for determining basic wages in calculating the monthly contractual work hours for calculating the minimum wage amount. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on contractual work hours, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the lower judgment against the Defendant is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Go Young-young

Chief Justice Cho Jae-hee

Justices Kim Jong-il

A person shall be appointed.