2. In a case where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect it.

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). Based on the foregoing legal doctrine, the lower court, based on the foregoing legal doctrine, determined the sentence by comprehensively taking account of the various circumstances as stated in its reasoning.

In addition to the circumstances indicated by the lower court, no new circumstance exists to change the sentence of the lower court in the trial, and even considering all of the sentencing factors indicated in the pleadings of the instant case, such as the Defendant’s age, character and conduct, environment, motive and means of crime, and circumstances after the crime, the lower court’s sentencing is too large and thus, does not seem to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion.

Therefore, the defendant's assertion is without merit.

3. As such, the defendant's appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act on the ground that it is without merit.

However, pursuant to Article 25(1) of the Regulation on Criminal Procedure, the term "Article 5-11 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (the point of causing bodily injury resulting from dangerous driving)" in the corresponding provision of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes shall be corrected ex officio to "Article 5-11 of the former Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (amended by Act No. 15981, Dec. 18, 2018)"

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