[2] In a case where a company's dismissal of a full-time employee dispatched to a superior organization on the ground that the company did not comply with the consultation for the return to the original position, the case holding that the disciplinary action was a deviation or abuse of discretionary power as it considerably lacks validity under the social norms

[3] Whether all relevant business falling under the scope of partnership activities is immediately a person engaged in union management as soon as possible (negative), and the method of determining the scope of business that a person engaged in union management may engage in (negative)

1. Determination on grounds of appeal Nos. 1, 3, and 4

A disposition of dismissal is justified when there are reasons for the employer to the extent that the employer cannot continue the employment relationship. Whether it is impossible for the employer to continue the employment relationship with the worker in question under social norms should be determined by comprehensively examining various circumstances such as the purpose and nature of the business, the circumstances of the workplace, the status and details of the worker in question, the motive and circumstances of the act of misconduct, the influence on the company's business order such as the risk of disturbing the company's deceptive order, and the attitude of work in the past (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Du10455 delivered on May 28, 2002).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined as follows, based on its reasoning, that the position held by the Defendant’s Intervenor (hereinafter “ Intervenor”) in the Korea Life Insurance Industry Workers’ Union (hereinafter “Life Insurance Workers’ Union”) cannot be deemed as a “standing officer or employee of a superior organization” under Article 22 of the collective agreement, and eventually, the Intervenor did not meet the requirements for a full-time employee since January 31, 2004, and if the Intervenor was disqualified as a full-time employee, he did not receive a new full-time employee from the Plaintiff, even though the Intervenor did not take any measures such as temporary retirement, and did not comply with the direction of consultation for returning to the original position without attending the company, the court below determined as follows: (a) the Intervenor’s failure to comply with the reasonable judgment on whether a disciplinary action constitutes grounds for disciplinary action under Article 14 subparag. 1, 6, and 8 of the Plaintiff Company’s Trade Union Regulations; and (b) failure to comply with the Plaintiff’s discretionary authority to dismiss the Intervenor from office for at least seven consecutive days.

In other words, the lower court determined that the Intervenor’s failure to meet the requirements for the second 0th 2nd 4th 2nd 0th 2nd 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 606th 6th 6th 6th 6th 606.

In light of the records, the court below’s determination on a disciplinary decision is justified as it is in accordance with the above legal principles, in full view of such circumstances as well as the circumstances considered in the judgment on the second ground for appeal.

Therefore, the grounds of appeal Nos. 1, 3, and 4 are without merit, which contain errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the interpretation of collective agreements, omission of judgment as to whether disciplinary action is proper, misunderstanding of legal principles, and misapprehension of legal principles as to deviation and abuse of discretionary power.

The Supreme Court precedents cited in the grounds of appeal are inappropriate because they differ from the case of this case.

2. Judgment on ground of appeal No. 2

The scope of work that a full-time employee may engage in only the work of a trade union pursuant to Article 24(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, cannot be said to be the work of a full-time employee who does not assume the duty to provide labor to the employer. The scope of work that a full-time employee may engage in should be determined individually by comprehensively taking into account the purpose and content of the relevant collective agreement recognizing such full-time employee, the genuine intent and practice of the parties to the collective agreement reflected in the payment of wages, etc.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the records, Article 22 of the current collective agreement provides that the company shall recognize five full-time union employees (executive officers and operating members of the union) recommended by the union representatives as full-time employees in exclusive charge of the union affairs, but shall separately recognize only one full-time employee at the time of the appointment of the senior organization or friendly organization. Article 23 provides that the full-time officer dispatched to a superior organization shall provide wages, promotion, and other treatment to the general members, as well as the full-time employee. Accordingly, upon the recommendation of the union members, the Plaintiff recognized the full-time employee as the full-time employee, such as the chief of the organization, office chief, and deputy chief of the union of the union of Korea, and the democratic union chief, and the fact that the Intervenor continued to receive wages from the Plaintiff as the full-time employee. Thus, in the instant collective agreement, the Plaintiff’s act of dispatching full-time employees to the full-time employee in exclusive charge of the union affairs within the Plaintiff’s place of business is not reasonable to recognize that it belongs to the senior union members and the union of labor union.

However, according to the records, there may still be controversy over the interpretation of the scope of duties of the dispatched employee under the collective agreement of this case at the time, and the above fact that the intervenor's candidate's election campaign pursuant to the union union decision and does not seem purely as a pure personal political activity, etc., may be considered as a disciplinary decision, and the judgment on a disciplinary decision of the court below is justifiable as seen earlier, as seen in the above. Therefore, even though the court below did not make an explicit decision on the plaintiff's assertion about the candidate's election campaign of the dispatched employee, it shall not affect the conclusion.

Therefore, the second ground of appeal, which asserts that there was an omission of judgment that affected the judgment of the court below, cannot be accepted.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party, including the part arising from the participation in the appeal. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Ji-hyung (Presiding Justice)