약정금
1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
1. According to the purport of Gap evidence No. 2 of the judgment as to the cause of claim and the whole pleadings, it can be acknowledged that the plaintiff, a stock company with the purpose of construction business on December 20, 2005, lent KRW 116,000,000 to the defendant, who was a stock company with the purpose of construction business on December 20, 2005, with the payment period fixed as of April 30, 2006, and did not repay it. Thus, the defendant is liable to pay the above loans and damages for delay to the
2. The judgment of the defendant on the defense of the defendant, however, the defendant, at the time of the filing of the lawsuit in this case, raised a defense that the defendant cannot respond to the plaintiff's claim because the above loans had already been extinguished by the extinctive prescription
In light of the above, since the Defendant, a merchant, borrowed money from the Plaintiff for its operation, the lending claim is a commercial activity. As such, the five-year commercial extinctive prescription is applicable pursuant to Article 64 of the Commercial Act, and the instant lawsuit is clearly filed on October 27, 2016 with the lapse of five years from the due date for payment. Therefore, the statute of limitations for the lending claim expired.
Therefore, the defendant's defense is justified.
[Plaintiff’s actual representative interest as to this, and the fact that the Defendant’s debt was partially repaid over several occasions from September 29, 2012 to April 30, 2013 from September 29, 2012 to April 30, 2013 from the joint and several surety at the time of the above loan, and thus, the statute of limitations has been interrupted. However, even if C paid part of the debt as a joint and several surety for the Defendant’s loan under the above loan, it does not have any evidence showing that C had the status of joint and several surety (C).
C) The Defendant’s representative director at the time from September 29, 2012 to April 30, 2013 was the Defendant’s representative authority solely with the descriptions of the evidence Nos. 3 to 14 (including the case of additional numbers).
(2).