2. The determination of sentencing is based on the statutory penalty, with a discretionary determination that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act, based on which our Criminal Procedure Act, which takes the trial-oriented principle and the principle of directness, has a unique area of the first instance trial regarding the

In addition to these circumstances and the ex post facto nature of the appellate court, it is reasonable to respect the sentencing conditions in cases where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, and to refrain from rendering a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court on the sole ground that the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, even though the sentence of the first instance court is somewhat different from the opinion of the appellate court,

(2) In light of the aforementioned facts, the lower court’s judgment is not deemed to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion, and it is reasonable to respect the sentencing of the lower court on the grounds that the sentencing of the lower court is deemed to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion, on the following grounds: (a) the Defendant, having been sentenced to the aforementioned punishment on the grounds stated in its reasoning for sentencing; (b) even before the instant case, the Defendant repeated the same crime despite a majority of criminal punishment for drinking driving; and (c) the circumstances unfavorable to the sentencing asserted by the prosecutor in the trial, such as the Defendant’s repeating of the same crime despite the fact that he/she had been subject to criminal punishment due to drinking driving; (d) the Defendant was led to the confession of and against the offense; (e) there was no fact that the Defendant was causing damage to others due to a traffic accident during drinking driving; and (e) the lower court’s sentence is the statutory maximum

Therefore, prosecutor's assertion is not accepted.

3.