The case shall be remanded to the Daegu District Court Panel Division.

1. The lower court’s recognition and judgment

The first and second lands are listed in the name of the deceased non-party 1 on the land cadastre of this case. The designated parties indicated in the attached Table 2 of the judgment below's death jointly inherited the rights and duties of the above land. On March 6, 194, the non-party 2 purchased the land of this case from the above non-party 1 and sold it to the non-party 3 and the non-party 4, and the remainder was donated to the non-party 6, the above non-party 5, and the non-party 3 acquired the above non-party 4 from July 3, 1986 to January 12, 1987, the plaintiff purchased the above non-party 5, the non-party 3, the non-party 1 and the non-party 4 acquired the land of this case from the non-party 1 and the non-party 6, who acquired the ownership transfer registration of the land of this case from the non-party 1 and the non-party 2, who acquired the remaining land of this case.

2. We examine the first ground for appeal.

As long as the lower court acknowledged the Plaintiff’s possession, the possessor is presumed to possess the Plaintiff’s possession in a public performance with the intention of possession, and the lower court, as so stated in the lawsuit, did not err by misapprehending the judgment below, but by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations on the ground that Defendant 2 was aware of the Plaintiff’s prescriptive acquisition, the lower court did not err by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, on the ground that it did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the part of the lower court.

3. We examine the second ground for appeal.

A person who asserts the acquisition by prescription may choose at will the starting point of the acquisition by prescription on land without any change in the owner, but it is a established precedent of a party member that makes it impossible to assert the completion of prescription on the ground that he/she arbitrarily selects the starting point of the acquisition by prescription or occupied for not less than 20 years retroactively if there is a change in

In this case where the ownership transfer registration is completed on Defendant 1 after the expiration of the prescriptive acquisition period, the court below decided that the designated parties and Defendant 1 choose at will the starting point of the prescriptive acquisition under the premise that the above registration is null and void because the sale between the designated parties and Defendant 1 is an anti-social legal act. If such premise of the court below is reasonable, the judgment of the court below is justified and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles as to the starting point of the prescriptive acquisition as

4. We examine the grounds of appeal Nos. 3 and 4

Examining the evidence cited by the court below based on the records, the court below's determination of the facts of possession of the land of this case and the facts of sale of the land of this case by the deceased non-party 1 are justified. The process of cooking evidence is sufficiently acceptable, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence or any violation of the rules of evidence or any violation of the rules of evidence or any violation of the rules of evidence judgment. It is without merit to discuss this

5. We examine the grounds of appeal No. 5.

In order for double selling of real estate to be null and void as an anti-social legal act, it is insufficient to say that the seller’s act of breach of trust and the buyer’s act of actively taking part in the seller’s act of breach of trust and that the buyer’s act of actively taking part in the sale should not have been sold to others. At least, it should be the extent to which the sales contract is concluded by requesting the sale even though the buyer was aware of such sale (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 81Meu197, Dec. 2, 1981). As to whether Defendant 2, who represented the designated party, was aware of the fact of sale by the deceased non-party 1, there is no other evidence to acknowledge it except the Plaintiff’s trend (No. 8-15, 16, the evidence No. 8-15, 16) that the other party

In addition, as to whether Defendant 1 was actively involved in the act of breach of trust by Defendant 2, who was aware of the fact that the deceased non-party 1 sold the land in this case, the testimony of the witness non-party 5 of the court below among the evidence required by the court below, is found to be around 1985, which was after the plaintiff's complaint by Defendant 2, and it shows the sale certificate (Evidence A7) between the deceased non-party 1 and his non-party 2. However, as stated in evidence No. 8-15, it cannot be said that it is extremely doubtful because the plaintiff's complaint by Defendant 2 was clearly contradictory to the fact that the plaintiff filed a complaint by June 198, 198, and the testimony of the witness non-party 8 of the court of first instance cannot be ascertained as having known the above fact and thus, it cannot be concluded that Defendant 1 failed to purchase the land from the plaintiff who asserted that he was the purchaser of the land in this case and did not sell it from Defendant 2, and it cannot be concluded that the plaintiff's testimony and evidence 15 were not known.

Under these circumstances, Defendant 1’s transfer of ownership cannot be deemed an invalidation registration based on anti-social juristic act. As long as the registration is not void, the Plaintiff, who did not make a registration after the completion of the acquisition period, cannot oppose Defendant 1, who completed the registration of ownership transfer, with the completion of the acquisition period.

Ultimately, the judgment of the court below which ruled that the transfer registration of Defendant 1 was null and void due to an anti-social juristic act, and accepted the request for transfer registration based on the prescriptive acquisition, shall be deemed to have affected the conclusion of the judgment by misunderstanding the facts in violation of the rules of evidence or failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, and therefore, it is reasonable to point this out.

6. The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)