1. The judgment of the court below is (1) the non-party 1 and the non-party 1 and the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 who were the owners of the above building site and the non-party 1 and the non-party 1 who were the owners of the above non-party 1 and the non-party 2 who were the owners of the above building at the time of 8th of Apr. 20, 1983. The non-party 1 and the non-party 1 were constructed at the plaintiff's expense and entered and registered again on the non-party 1, and it was hard to obtain a construction permit under the above non-party 1's name and the non-party 2's non-party 3's non-party 1 and the non-party 2's non-party 3's non-party 1 and the non-party 3's non-party 1 and the non-party 3's non-party 1 and the non-party 2's non-party 1 and the non-party 3's non-party 1 and the non-party 1.

In light of the above facts, since the plaintiff's request for voluntary auction was made as of July 9, 1983 with respect to the building site and existing building which are the object of the above right to collateral security, it cannot be seen that even if it was constructed by title under the agreement with the non-party 1 who is the original owner until then, it did not have utility as an independent building, even if it had been constructed by title under the agreement with the non-party 1, it cannot be seen that the non-party 2 had a right to use the building site and existing building which are the object of the above right to collateral security and the non-party 4 building, which are the object of the above right to collateral security and the non-party 4 building, and it cannot be seen that the non-party 2 had a right to use the building site and existing building, which is the object of the above right to collateral security and it cannot be seen that the non-party 3 had a right to use the building site and existing building, which is the object of the above construction without permission, even if it had been entered in the right to request for voluntary auction.

However, the plaintiff and the above non-party 1, who owned the building of the second floor, agreed to obtain a building permit in the name of the non-party 1, who was the owner of the building site, to complete the completion inspection at the same time, and to complete the registration of the transfer of ownership under the plaintiff's name, and to complete the registration of the transfer of ownership pursuant to the above agreement, was already recognized. However, in light of the above agreement, once the building of the second floor was entrusted in the name of the non-party 1, who was the name of the building permit, and completed the registration of the transfer of ownership to the plaintiff, the original acquisition of the building of the second floor was agreed to grant the registration of the transfer of ownership to the non-party 1, who is the name of the building permit. Thus, the original acquisition effect of the building of the second floor was entirely attributed to the non-party 1, who is the name of the building permit. In this case, there is no evidence to find out that there was any special circumstance such as the plaintiff's termination of the above title trust agreement.

Therefore, the plaintiff's primary claim is no longer acceptable because it is no longer reasonable to judge it.

In light of its contents, the part on the second floor, which is the building in dispute, was constructed by the plaintiff and acquired the ownership of the plaintiff. However, the plaintiff and the non-party 1, who is the owner of the site of the building in question, obtained a building permit under the above non-party 1's name and completed the registration of preservation of ownership after being entrusted in the name of the non-party 1 after completion of the construction, and the registration of preservation of ownership was made in the name of the non-party 1, the effect of original acquisition of the building in the second floor in this case was made to the non-party 1, the title holder of the building permit, and thus, the effect of original acquisition of the building in this case was reverted to

2. If the plaintiff constructed the second floor of this case as seen in the original edition, regardless of whether the construction permit was made in the name of the non-party 1, the plaintiff would have acquired the ownership. This point is also recognized in the original judgment. Therefore, it is not easy to say that the original acquisition can externally assert its effect even if the plaintiff did not preserve the ownership in the name of the non-party 1.

Even though the plaintiff and the above non-party 1 agreed to make a registration of initial acquisition of the second floor completed under the above non-party 1's name and to make a registration of initial ownership preservation pursuant to the agreement, the plaintiff may claim the original acquisition of the second floor externally until the registration of initial ownership preservation is made, and there is no dispute between the parties as to the above non-party 1's acquisition of ownership of the above second floor building in the above non-party 1's name. Thus, the above non-party 1 cannot claim the acquisition of ownership of the above second floor building externally, and there is no complaint as to the effect of original acquisition of the plaintiff's original acquisition. However, the original acquisition and the original acquisition were attributed to the above non-party 1 cannot be deemed to be erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to original acquisition and the illegality thereof constitutes grounds for reversal of the judgment under Article 12 (2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings, etc., and therefore, the judgment of the court below which argued this point is without merit.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed and remanded. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee Chang-chul (Presiding Justice)