With respect to paragraph 1:

In light of the records and records of the judgment of the first instance cited by the original judgment and the original judgment, it cannot be recognized that there was an illegality in the hearing in the original judgment, and the facts charged are denied, or there is a violation of the rules of evidence. Thus, the determination of the facts in the original judgment is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the fact-finding judge, and even considering the records, it is not recognized that there is an illegality in violation of the rules of evidence in the original judgment. Thus, in this case where the court below had suspended the sentence of a fine to the defendant, it is attributable to the ground for appeal.

The issue is groundless.

With respect to Section 2:

The fact that a trademark is widely known to the court below's decision and arguments is identical with or similar to a mark for public use under Article 5 (1) 5 of the former Trademark Act (amended by Act No. 2506, Feb. 8, 1973; hereinafter the below), Article 5 (1) 5 of the same Act (amended by Act No. 2506, Feb. 8, 1973; hereinafter referred to as "the former Trademark Act"), which is likely to cause confusion or confusion with the goods under Article 5 (1) 8 of the same Act, and subsequent revision of the Trademark Act (amended by Act No. 2506, Feb. 8, 1973; hereinafter referred to as "the amended by Act No. 2506), which constitutes a trademark identical with or similar to the goods under Article 9 (1) 9 of the former Trademark Act and which is used by a defense counsel for the designated goods (amended by Act No. 2506, Feb. 8, 1973).

In addition, under Article 15 of the former Trademark Act, the trademark interest holder registered has the right to exclusively use the registered trademark for the goods designated in accordance with the classification table separately determined. Article 23 of the amended Trademark Act also provides for the same purpose. Article 19 of the former Trademark Act provides for the registration of correction to add the designated goods by the trademark right holder. Article 53 of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act provides for the method of designating goods using the trademark by the applicant for trademark registration and the designation of the designated goods under Chapter 18 (Class 8 of the designated goods of the G that is registered as F) and Chapter 39 (Class 39, the designated goods of the J that are registered as the applicant for trademark registration from the defendant's side (H Co., Ltd.) and Chapter 39 (Class 18 of the designated goods of the H Co., Ltd.). Thus, the issue of whether this case falls under Category 18 or 39 of the former Trademark Act is whether this case falls under the category of goods listed in each of the above subparagraphs, and it is an application for the registration of the above Category 1.

If the facts are as above, even if it is against the classification method of the above 18, which is the designated goods of the above non-indicted 18, as in the theory of the lawsuit, the registration of the above non-indicted 1 is additionally registered as a result of the application of the above non-indicted 1, so long as the registration is in force until the registration becomes null and void, the defendant is not able to use the trademark identical or similar to the above non-indicted 1's designated goods or goods similar to the above non-indicted 1's designated goods, and therefore, in this case where the above registration invalidation trial has not become final and conclusive, the defendant's second instance's trademark right is infringed.

Therefore, the court below's decision to the same purport is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles or lack of reasoning as to the trademark law such as the theory of lawsuit in the original judgment, and it does not conflict with the judgment on the original court's decision.

All arguments are groundless.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Hong-chul (Presiding Justice)