2. The costs of the lawsuit are assessed against the defendant.

A. On March 15, 2001, the Plaintiff was suffering from an occupational accident, and completed medical treatment after receiving medical treatment approval from March 15, 2001 to July 31, 2003, with respect to the injury and disease of “the first half of half of half of half of half of half of the inside and outside of the lusium, and the second half of the side of the lusium inside and outside of the lusium.”

B. On February 25, 2009, the Plaintiff filed an application for re-medical care to refund the fluence to the right slot, and completed the re-medical care from March 16, 2009 to January 13, 2010 after receiving approval for the re-medical care (the Plaintiff filed an application for the additional disease of “after the fluence to the fluence” and “after the fluence to the fluence,” during the period of this medical care and received the approval).

C. On May 31, 2010, the Plaintiff filed an application for additional medical care and temporary layoff benefits. From June 16, 2006 to October 28, 2008, the Plaintiff was about additional medical care and temporary layoff benefits during the period.

(1) On July 21, 2010, the Defendant approved only the medical care for the remainder of the period from August 9, 2006 to February 12, 2007 relating to the operation on August 10, 206 (for example, semi-monthly surgery; hereinafter “fluoral surgery”), and determined non-approval of the medical care for the remainder of the period, on the ground that the claim for the medical care for the period of approval for the additional medical care has expired three-year extinctive prescription.

(2) On July 23, 2010, the Defendant issued a land-based temporary layoff measure on the ground that the period of approval for the above application for temporary layoff benefits has expired, on the ground that the remaining period of temporary layoff benefits was the period of non-approval for the additional medical care (hereinafter “instant disposition”) due to the expiration of the extinctive prescription (hereinafter “extinctive prescription period”).

D. On July 28, 2010, the Plaintiff planned to undergo an operation in relation to the foregoing occupational accident, and applied for additional medical care. On August 2, 2010, the Defendant approved this.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1, 5 evidence, Eul evidence 3 and 4 (including above number), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the disposition is lawful;

A. The plaintiff's assertion

① The Plaintiff filed an application for additional medical care on July 23, 2007 and February 24, 2009 with respect to the annual dysium as of August 10, 2006. As such, the Plaintiff’s claim for temporary disability compensation benefit approval period for the additional medical care was suspended on July 23, 2007 and February 24, 2009 under Article 113 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act. Therefore, the Defendant’s disposition based on the expiration of the extinctive prescription is unlawful.

② Even if it is not so, the Defendant’s disposition of this case on the ground of the expiration of the extinctive prescription is unlawful as it goes against the principle of good faith and thereby constitutes an abuse of rights.

(b) Related statutes;

It is as shown in the attached Table related statutes.

C. Determination

(1) Judgment as to the Plaintiff’s assertion

(A) Interpretation of Article 113 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (hereinafter “Industrial Accident Insurance Act”)

Article 113 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act provides that "the extinctive prescription under Article 112 shall be interrupted by a request made pursuant to Article 36 (2). In this case, where a request is the first request requiring a judgment on whether a occupational accident occurred under Article 5 subparagraph 1, the interruption of prescription caused by such request shall also extend to other insurance benefits as provided for in Article 36 (1)." The defendant asserts that an initial request is limited to the first request for medical care, and thus, an application for medical care does not fall under such initial request. However, the above provision is newly established as of December 14, 2007 (the enforcement date: July 1, 2008) by wholly amending the Industrial Accident Insurance Act (the first request for medical care) (the date: 200 if a request for medical care is made by an employee without approval of a different claim for medical care benefits, while the first request for medical care benefits, such as temporary disability compensation benefits, is suspended, and it appears that the first request for medical care, other than the first request for medical care benefits, etc.

(B) Specific determination

On July 23, 2007, the Plaintiff filed an application for additional medical care with respect to franchising surgery, but completed and submitted a written request for return on August 3, 2007 at the request of the employee of the Defendant, and rejected the application. On February 25, 2009, with respect to franchising surgery at the time of filing an application for additional medical care, the facts attached to the operation records and the medical records related thereto are either not disputed between the parties, or may be acknowledged by adding Gap evidence 5, Eul evidence 1, 2 (including each number), each statement of evidence 1, and 2 (including each number), the witness’s witness’s testimony to the whole purport of oral argument. However, since the application for additional medical care on July 23, 2007 was rejected at the request of the Plaintiff on August 3, 2007, it is difficult to recognize the validity of the medical care benefit itself as well, and the Plaintiff’s assertion on February 25, 2009 cannot be accepted.

(2) Judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion

The exercise of a debtor's right of defense based on the statute of limitations is also governed by the principle of good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights, which are the major principles of our Civil Act. Thus, in special circumstances where the debtor acted to make it impossible or considerably difficult for the creditor to exercise his right or the interruption of prescription prior to the completion of the statute of limitations, or where the creditor acts to believe that such measures are unnecessary, or the creditor was objectively unable to exercise his right, or the debtor was unable to invoke the statute of limitations after the expiration of the statute of limitations, or where the creditor made the creditor trusted it, or where there are special circumstances such as making the creditor believe that the debtor would not invoke the statute of limitations after the expiration of the statute of limitations, or where part of the creditors of the same condition requires to protect the creditor clearly unfair or unfair, the debtor's assertion for the completion of the statute of limitations cannot be allowed as an abuse of rights against the principle of good faith (Supreme Court en banc Decision 2007Du2

이 사건의 경우, 당사자 사이에 다툼이 없거나, 앞서 든 증거들과 갑 제4호증의 1, 2의 각 기재에 의하여 알 수 있는 다음의 각 사정 즉, ㉠ 연골절제술에 관하여 원고가 2007. 7. 23. 재요양신청을 하였다가 피고 직원의 권유로 반려요청을 할 당시 피고의 직원 소외인은 “재요양으로 수술을 받기 전에 재요양신청을 하는 것이 일반적인데 원고는 이미 1년 정도 전인 2006. 8. 10. 연골절제술을 받은 이후에 재요양신청을 하였으므로 재요양을 승인하기 어렵다”는 취지로 원고에게 반려요청을 할 것을 권유하였고 원고의 반려요청서에 문서 제목까지 직접 기재한 점, ㉡ 원고는 2010. 1. 8. “승인 전 진료비로 요양비를 청구”하는 신청을 하였다가 또다시 반려요청서를 제출하여 위 소외인으로부터 요양비 청구서 등을 반려 받았는데, 앞서 본 사실관계를 고려하면, 위 요양비도 위 연골절제술에 관한 것으로 볼 여지가 많은 점, ㉢ 원고가 2007. 7. 23. 재요양신청을 할 무렵 재요양신청의 승인이 있은 후에 피재자가 재요양 승인기간 동안의 휴업급여를 청구하고 피고도 그와 같이 휴업급여를 청구하도록 안내하는 것이 통상적인 업무처리 관행이었던 점, ㉣ 2007. 7. 23. 요양신청에 대한 피고 직원의 반려요청 권유는 수술에 관하여 재요양을 받기 위해서는 수술 전에 재요양신청을 해야 한다는 법령상·사실상의 제한이 없음에도 불구하고 그와 같은 법령상·사실상의 제한이 존재하는 것처럼 원고에게 설명한 것으로서 피고의 업무처리의 편의만을 염두에 둔 부당한 처사로 보이는 점, ㉤ 연골절제술에 관하여 2010. 7. 21. 요양승인이 있었던 것에 비추어 볼 때 피고 직원의 부당한 반려 요청 권유가 없었다면 원고는 2007. 7. 23. 신청한 재요양에 관하여 승인을 받고 연골절제술 재요양 승인기간 동안의 휴업급여도 지급받았을 것으로 보이는 점, ㉥ 연골절제술에 관한 재요양신청이 반려되는 상황에서 원고가 그에 관한 휴업급여신청을 할 것을 기대하기는 어려운 점, ㉦ 피고는 고용노동부장관의 위탁을 받아 산재보험법의 목적, 즉 “산업재해보상보험 사업을 시행하여 근로자의 업무상의 재해를 신속하고 공정하게 보상하며, 재해근로자의 재활 및 사회 복귀를 촉진하기 위하여 이에 필요한 보험시설을 설치·운영하고, 재해 예방과 그 밖에 근로자의 복지 증진을 위한 사업을 시행하여 근로자 보호에 이바지하는 것”을 달성하기 위한 사업을 효율적으로 수행하기 위한 공적 조직이므로, 근로자의 업무상 재해를 신속하고 공정하게 보상함으로써 근로자 보호에 이바지하여야 할 지위에 있는 점을 종합하면, 피고는 원고의 휴업급여청구의 권리행사나 그 시효중단을 불가능 또는 현저히 곤란하게 하였거나 객관적으로 원고의 휴업급여청구의 권리행사에 사실상 장애사유가 존재한 경우로서 피고의 소멸시효 완성의 주장은 신의성실의 원칙에 반하여 권리남용으로서 허용되지 않는 것이므로 소멸시효 완성을 이유로 한 피고의 이 사건 처분은 위법하고, 원고의 위 ② 주장은 이유 있다.

3. Conclusion

If so, the plaintiff's claim is justified and accepted.

[Attachment Omission of Related Acts]

Justices Kim Don-do