2. The plaintiff (appointed)'s claim is dismissed.

3. All costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The disposition of imposition of each property tax and local education tax imposed by the Defendant on November 12, 2014 by the Plaintiff (Appointed Party) and the designated parties shall be revoked.

2. Purport of appeal

The same shall apply to the order.

The court's explanation on this part is the same as the corresponding part of the judgment of the court of first instance, and thus, this part is cited by Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. Determination

A. As to the allegation in the above 1)

1) The main text of Article 107(1) of the Local Tax Act provides that “A person who actually owns a property as of the property tax base date shall be liable to pay the property tax.” The term “person who actually owns a property” refers to a person who actually owns a property regardless of whether it is registered as an owner on the public register (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Du15045, Mar. 23, 2006). The main text of Article 107(1) of the Local Tax Act stipulates that a person liable to pay property tax is an owner who is not an owner or a legal owner, but a person who actually owns a property who is not a owner on the public register, regardless of the form and appearance of a legal owner under private law, so that a person who actually controls the property from the viewpoint of economic and substantial aspects to fulfill the principle of substantial taxation, and therefore, in determining whether a person is an owner or a substantive owner, it does not necessarily require the complete use, profit-making, and disposal of the property under private law.

2) However, Article 36(1) of the Urban Development Act provides that if a land substitution is designated, the owner of the previous land may exercise the same right as that of the previous land substitution, from the effective date of the designation of the land substitution to the date of the public announcement of the land substitution disposition, and that the previous land cannot use or profit from the previous land. Article 36(3) of the same Act provides that if the designation of the land substitution becomes effective, the previous owner of the land substitution cannot use or profit from the previous land substitution, and cannot interfere with the exercise of rights pursuant to Article 10(1) of the Local Tax Act. In addition, the previous owner of the land can dispose of the land substitution after the designation of the land substitution becomes effective, and where a sale contract is concluded for the land substitution, the object of the sale shall be deemed to be the object of the land substitution to be determined in the future (see Supreme Court Decision 89Meu1498, May 25, 190). In light of this, the previous owner has the ability to actually control the land substitution from the economic and substantive point of view.

3) In the instant case, since the disposition of designating a reserved land for replotting was effective from September 6, 2012, the Plaintiffs are obligated to pay property tax and local education tax as those who actually own a reserved land for replotting as of June 1, 2014, which is the property tax assessment basis date of the property tax in 2014. Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to use a reserved land for replotting is no obstacle to the imposition of property tax. The Plaintiff’s assertion on this part is without merit.

B. As to the allegation on the above 2)

1) In a case where the tax authority recognized that the grounds for objection are correct in the course of appeal procedure, and accordingly made the necessary disposition accordingly, in view of the purport of the aforementioned statutory provisions recognizing the objection procedure and the method of correction, the former disposition cannot be reversed and remanded without any justifiable reason. Thus, inasmuch as the tax authority revoked ex officio the tax disposition by deeming the grounds for objection in the procedure of filing an objection regarding the taxation disposition as justifiable, it is not allowed to reverse it without any special reason and re-resume the previous disposition (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 77Nu266, Jan. 31, 1978; 2007Du18161, Jun. 24, 2010).

2) After the plaintiff was notified of the previous disposition of this case, it raised an objection to the purport that the plaintiffs are not owners of the previous land scheduled for substitution. The defendant accepted the plaintiff's objection that the previous land was expropriated after examining the data submitted by the plaintiff, and revoked ex officio the previous disposition of this case. However, in full view of the above evidence and the purport of pleadings No. 5 and No. 9, the defendant still confirmed that the previous disposition of this case was an ex officio cancellation or cancellation of the previous provisional disposition of this case by the Seoul High Court's decision of December 23, 2013 and the previous provisional disposition of this case, which was submitted by the plaintiff, was not an expression "the date of expropriation" and "the previous provisional disposition of this case," which was not an expression "the previous provisional disposition of this case," which was not an expression "ex officio cancellation or cancellation of the previous provisional disposition of this case," and it was not an expression "the previous provisional disposition of this case," which was not an expression of the plaintiff's previous land scheduled for substitution."

C. As to the allegation in the above 3)

According to the purport of the evidence Nos. 11 and 12 of this case, the instant association obtained authorization for the alteration of a land substitution plan from the Defendant on April 23, 2015, and through the public announcement and public inspection from April 30, 2015 to May 16, 2015, and the disposition of the designation of a land substitution plan pursuant to the modified land substitution plan was recognized on May 21, 2015. However, there is no evidence to acknowledge that the instant land substitution plan was retroactively revoked, and the Defendant issued the instant land substitution plan based on the previous land substitution plan as of June 1, 2014, which was effective as of June 1, 2014, and therefore, this part of the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit.

3. Conclusion

If so, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed due to the lack of reason, and the judgment of the court of first instance is unfair with different conclusions, and it is revoked and dismissed.

[Attachment]

Judge highest order (Presiding Judge)