1. According to the record as to the defendant's case, the defendant appealed against the judgment of the court of first instance and asserted only unfair sentencing on the grounds of appeal.

In such a case, the argument that the lower court erred by mistake of facts or by misunderstanding of legal principles is not a legitimate ground for appeal.

In addition, the argument that the judgment of the court below contains an error of law beyond the inherent limit of the discretion of sentencing due to insufficient deliberation on the circumstances which are conditions for sentencing is ultimately an unfair argument of sentencing.

According to Article 383 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, only in cases where death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment with or without prison labor for not less than ten years is imposed, an appeal shall be allowed on the grounds of unfair sentencing.

In this case where a more minor punishment is imposed against the defendant, the argument that the amount of punishment is unfair is not a legitimate ground for appeal.

Meanwhile, as a matter of course, a court does not separately impose the person subject to registration who is subject to the duty to submit personal information, but if a conviction becomes final and conclusive due to a sex offense subject to registration, the part on the argument in the grounds of appeal disputing the first deliberation notice, which is only meaningful to inform the person subject to the duty to submit such information, does not affect the judgment and does not constitute a legitimate ground for appeal (see Supreme Court Decision 2014Do3564, Nov. 13, 2014). 2. In light of the following circumstances comprehensively taking into account: (a) the person subject to the order to observe the protection order’s age, character and environment; (b) the motive and consequence of each of the instant crimes; and (c) the motive and consequence of each of the instant crimes; and (d) the circumstances after the crime, etc., of the person subject to the order to observe the protection order, which

In light of the above, the court of first instance ordering the protection observation for two years from the date of completion of the execution of punishment.