2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

The disposition taken by the Defendant against the Plaintiff on March 24, 2017 is revoked for 30 days as to the suspension of the operation of the truck listed in the attached Table 1 of the judgment of the first instance.

2. Purport of appeal

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

The reasoning of this Court’s reasoning is as follows: (a) the Defendant’s argument presented in this case is identical to the part of the first instance judgment, except for the addition of the judgment, which is identical to that of the second instance judgment; and (b) thus, (c) pursuant to Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the text

2. Additional determination

A. The Defendant asserts that, in determining whether the “vehicle scrapping of a truck” subject to reporting on the change in the permitted matters under Article 3(3) proviso and Article 2 subparag. 4 of the Enforcement Decree of the Trucking Transport Business Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 23372, Dec. 13, 2011; hereinafter “Enforcement Decree”), is permissible as of the time of new registration of the relevant vehicle. Since the instant vehicle was a vehicle for which the increase in the number of trucks was permitted at the time of new registration of the instant vehicle, the instant vehicle constitutes the “vehicle scrapping of a general cargo lane for which the increase in the number of trucks permitted for the increase in the number of trucks” and the instant vehicle is subject to the permission for change under the main sentence of Article 3(3) of the Trucking Transport Business Act.

B. However, the phrase “a change to a general cargo vehicle or a special-purpose truck with which an increase in the number of vehicles is permitted,” is a result of increasing the number of vehicles for which a new supply is permitted, so permission for change under the main sentence of Article 3(3) of the Trucking Transport Business Act is obtained, and the phrase “a change to a special-purpose truck with which an increase in the number of vehicles is not permitted,” does not constitute a new supply of a truck in violation of the standards for the supply of trucking transport services (Notice of the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs), and thus only a report for change under the proviso to the same paragraph (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2015Do1040, Apr. 15, 2016). As such, the issue of whether the increase in the number of trucks of the relevant truck, which is the criteria for determining whether a replacement of the truck, is permitted, should be determined as at the time

According to Gap evidence Nos. 2 and 7, and Eul evidence Nos. 2 and 2, the vehicle of this case was modified to the above vehicle on Jan. 31, 2005 when the increase of truck for freezing and freezing was allowed, but it was classified as a special-use truck, the supply of which is restricted pursuant to the criteria for trucking transport business (Public Notice No. 2007-622 of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation) since Jan. 1, 2008. Thus, the automobile of this case constitutes "the alteration of a special-use truck, the supply restriction type of which is not allowed, to a general-use truck," and thus, the automobile of this case constitutes "the replacement of a truck," which is subject to the alteration report under the proviso to Article 3 (3) of the Trucking Transport Act and Article 2 subparag. 4 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act. Accordingly, the defendant's assertion on other premise is without merit.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the court of first instance is just and the defendant's appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Kim Woo-hun (Presiding Judge)