2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

On October 7, 2013, the Plaintiff applied for refugee status to the Defendant on October 21, 2013 while entering and staying in the Republic of Korea for short-term visit visa (C-3 and 15 days of sojourn) on October 7, 2013.

On October 23, 2014, the Defendant rendered a disposition to deny the Plaintiff’s application for refugee status (hereinafter “instant disposition”) on the ground that the Plaintiff’s assertion does not constitute “a well-founded fear of persecution” as stipulated in Article 1 of the Refugee Convention and Article 1 of the Refugee Protocol.

The Plaintiff filed an objection with the Minister of Justice on November 26, 2014, but the said objection was dismissed on the same ground as September 24, 2015, and the said dismissal decision was notified to the Plaintiff on November 4, 2015.

【The Plaintiff’s assertion as to the legitimacy of the instant disposition indicated in Gap’s evidence Nos. 1 through 4, Eul’s evidence Nos. 1 and 2 is sufficient to the Plaintiff’s assertion. The Plaintiff’s assertion is an Egbidi local origin Egbidi, and the residents of the native village are flickly and physically living in the native folks around 20 years of age. The Plaintiff’s assertion that the instant disposition was lawful. The residents of the native village were flickly living in the native folks around 20 years of age.

However, on September 15, 2013, the Plaintiff still reported that the high-speed village people continue to satisfy in the native folks, and prevented them from spreading to the ruling party where they gather the natives, and thereafter, the high-speed village people threaten the death of the Plaintiff.

Therefore, the defendant's disposition of this case that did not recognize the plaintiff as a refugee is unlawful even though the possibility that the plaintiff would be stuffed due to the above circumstances is high in case the plaintiff returned to Austria.

Judgment

If the above facts are added to the purport of the statements and the whole arguments in Eul evidence Nos. 3 through 5, it is not sufficient to view that the plaintiff has a sufficiently-founded fear of persecution to the plaintiff, taking into account the following circumstances, and evidence to prove otherwise.