대여금 등
1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
1. The parties' assertion
A. On September 3, 1996, the plaintiff argued that the plaintiff lent KRW 36 million to the defendant, received a cash custody certificate from the defendant, and the defendant's wife C signed a cash custody certificate as the observer.
C transferred to the Plaintiff KRW 1 million on October 11, 2012, and KRW 1 million on October 4, 2013, thereby repaying part of the Defendant’s above loan obligations. On October 3, 2013, the Plaintiff’s wife died and 49 days elapsed since her death, the Defendant found with C, together with C, and provided the Plaintiff with KRW 2 million in cash, and discharged part of the obligation.
Therefore, the Defendant is obligated to pay the remainder of the loan to the Plaintiff KRW 32 million and damages for delay.
B. The Defendant’s summary did not borrow money from the Plaintiff.
Even if the Defendant borrowed the above money, the time of lending the Plaintiff’s claim was extinguished by the statute of limitations on September 3, 1996, which was around 10 years thereafter.
The defendant did not have paid part of the loan borrowed by the plaintiff to the plaintiff, and the defendant did not pay part of the loan borrowed by the plaintiff to the plaintiff because the defendant did not have any relation to the defendant.
2. Determination
A. Although the order of judgment is disputed as to whether the Plaintiff lent KRW 36 million to the Defendant, the Plaintiff’s claim of this case is groundless if the claim of this case expired by prescription even if the Plaintiff lent the above money to the Defendant, and thus, it is first determined as to the extinction of prescription.
B. Extinctive prescription shall run from the time when the rights occur objectively and the rights can be exercised.
Unless there is any assertion and proof that the Plaintiff lent KRW 36 million to the Defendant on September 3, 1996 and separately determined the due date, the above loan claim should be deemed to have run from the time of the loan.
On April 2019, 10 years have passed since the date of lease by the Plaintiff.