폭력행위등처벌에관한법률위반(집단,흉기등협박),폭력행위등처벌에관한법률위반(집단•흉기등주거침입),절도,공무집행방해,특정범죄가중처벌등에관한법률위반(운전자폭행등),공용물건손상
A. Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (collectives, deadly Weapons, etc.)
(b) Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a collective action, a deadly weapon, etc.);
(c) Larceny;
(d) Performance of official duties;
(e) Violation of the Aggravated Punishment Act;
(f) Damage to public goods;
A
Defendant
Attorney W (Court-Appointed)
Daegu District Court Decision 2013No36, 2013No696 decided April 26, 2013
July 12, 2013
The appeal is dismissed.
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Article 283(3) of the Criminal Act provides only the crime of simple intimidation and the crime of special intimidation under the Criminal Act, which cannot be prosecuted against the clearly expressed will of the victim. As such, Article 283(3) of the Criminal Act provides that Article 283(3) of the Criminal Act shall not apply to the crime of special intimidation which shows the threat of collective force or carries dangerous objects under Article 284 of the Criminal Act, and Article 283(3) of the Criminal Act shall not apply to Article 3(1) of the Act on the Punishment of Violences, etc., which applies to the defendant's act of carrying a deadly weapon in this case. Article 283(1) of the Criminal Act provides that a person who commits any of the crimes under Article 2(1) of the above Act or a person who commits such crime by carrying a deadly weapon or other dangerous objects, and does not have any provision as to the application of Article 283(3) of the Criminal Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2008Do46588).
Unlike this, the assertion by a state appointed defense counsel on the premise that a violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a collective, deadly weapon, etc.) constitutes a crime of non-compliance cannot be accepted.
2. Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted by the lower court, it is justifiable for the lower court to have rejected the Defendant’s assertion on mental and physical disability, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence
3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Lee Jae-soo