2. In light of the fact that the sentencing based on the statutory penalty is a discretionary judgment that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act, and the fact that the sentencing of the first instance court does not change in the conditions for sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect it. Although the first instance court’s sentencing falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to reverse the first instance court’s judgment and to refrain from imposing a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court’s opinion on the grounds that it differs from the appellate court

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). The fact that the Defendant appears to have the attitude of recognizing and opposing the instant crime, the driving distance is relatively short, and the fact that there are family members responsible for the Defendant’s livelihood should be considered in favor of the Defendant.

However, in light of the fact that drinking driving may infringe on the life and body of not only the driver but also the citizens using the road, the defendant has been punished for the same kind of crime several times, the defendant has not been aware of the fact that he left the place of suspended execution two times, and the degree of drinking is considerably significant, it cannot be deemed that the nature of the crime and the crime are light.

The above circumstances are disadvantageous to the defendant.

In full view of the above circumstances, in light of the applicable sentences and relevant sentencing cases, etc., the lower court’s judgment is deemed to have exceeded the reasonable bounds of discretion or it is deemed unfair to maintain the lower court’s judgment as it is.