2. The determination of sentencing is based on the statutory penalty, with a discretionary determination that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act, based on which our Criminal Procedure Act, which takes the trial-oriented principle and the principle of directness, has a unique area of the first instance trial regarding the

In addition to these circumstances and the ex post facto nature of the appellate court, it is reasonable to respect the sentencing conditions in cases where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, and to refrain from rendering a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court on the sole ground that the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, even though the sentence of the first instance court is somewhat different from the opinion of the appellate court,

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). The lower court, based on its stated reasoning, sentenced the above sentence to the Defendant on the grounds of sentencing. In light of the following: (a) the Defendant led to confession and reflects the Defendant; and (b) there was no criminal record of the same kind of crime; and (c) the circumstances favorable to the sentencing alleged by the Defendant in the trial at the trial are sufficiently taken into account when determining the punishment at the lower court; (b) the nature of the crime, such as the Defendant’s operation of a very large illegal gambling site, is not good; (c) the degree of participation cannot be deemed minor; (d) the Defendant committed a systematic and intelligent crime with multiple accomplices by sharing roles together with multiple accomplices; and (e) the Defendant engaged in illegal business on a systematic and intelligent basis; and (e) the Defendant’s profit-making cannot be deemed to have been lost, the lower court’s sentencing judgment does not seem to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion.