Defendant

A shall be punished by imprisonment with prison labor for six months and by imprisonment for four months.

A. In fact, the Defendants were comprehensively delegated the authority to purchase insurance and receive insurance proceeds to D who is the owner of the Kussa car.

Since the Defendants, according to legitimate authority, prepare a power of attorney in the name of D and claim and receive insurance money, the forgery, uttering, and fraud cannot be established.

Even if it can not be seen that the insurance-related authority was comprehensively delegated, the Defendants did not have any intention to forge, display, or commit fraud, as such mistake was made by the Defendants.

B. The sentencing of the lower court (one year of imprisonment with prison labor, and six months of imprisonment with prison labor) is too unreasonable.

2. Ex officio determination

A. According to the records of Defendant A, Defendant A was sentenced to two years of imprisonment for fraud, etc. at the Incheon District Court on March 29, 2018, and the judgment became final and conclusive on April 6, 2018.

The instant crime committed prior to the final judgment and the final judgment are in a concurrent relationship between the latter part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act and the latter part of Article 39(1) of the Criminal Act, and the sentence shall be imposed in consideration of equity and the same.

In this respect, the judgment of the court below against Defendant A cannot be maintained as it is.

B. According to Defendant B’s records, the following facts are acknowledged: (a) Defendant B was sentenced to six months of imprisonment with prison labor on November 25, 2015 and the judgment became final and conclusive on December 3, 2015 (hereinafter “final and conclusive judgment”); (b) Defendant B was sentenced to imprisonment with prison labor on September 1, 2016 by the Daejeon District Court for a violation of the Automobile Management Act; (c) the instant crime was committed before the final and conclusive judgment became final and conclusive; and (d) the crime of final and conclusive judgment in the instant case was committed after the date the first final and conclusive judgment became final and conclusive; and (e) the crime of final and conclusive judgment in the instant case was committed after the date the first final judgment became final and conclusive.

According to this, the crime of this case and the crime of final judgment No. 2 cannot be adjudicated at the same time from the beginning. Thus, Article 39(1) of the Criminal Act is applicable.