Attorney Lee Young-young, Lee Young-young, Park Young-chul, Cho Jae-in, and Public-service Advocates

Jin, Ginnae, Saz.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

A. On March 31, 2005, the Plaintiff entered the Army and served as a communications soldier at the BS Telecommunication Team, and was discharged on April 14, 2007.

B. On January 2, 2006, the Plaintiff asserted that “Around 2006, the Plaintiff incurred in the installation of the antenna on the vehicle, and knee injury (hereinafter “the instant wound”) on the part of the skne-type skne-type skne-type skne-type skne-type skne-type skne-type skne-type skne-type skne-type skne-type skne-type skne-type skne-type skne-type skne-type skne-type skne-type skne-type skne-type skne-type skne-type skne (hereinafter “the instant wound”).” On October 20, 2015, the Board of Patriots and Veterans Entitlement decided that the Plaintiff did not meet the requirements for persons eligible for veteran’s compensation, but did not meet the requirements for distinguished service to the military.

C. After that, the Plaintiff asserted that “the injury of the instant case was directly caused by credit incurred during the harsh training on January 2006, and thus constitutes the requirements for persons who rendered distinguished services to the State.” On November 19, 2018, the Plaintiff filed an application for change of the classification subject to support to the Defendant on November 19, 2018.

D. On March 8, 2019, the Defendant issued a notice to the Plaintiff on March 8, 2019 on the ground that it is difficult to see the first difference that occurred during the instant harsh training by the Board of Patriots and Veterans Entitlement after its deliberation and resolution, and thus, it is not recognized that it was injured in the performance of duties or education and training directly related to national defense, security, or the protection of people's lives and property, and thus, it does not meet the requirements for a person of distinguished service to the State (hereinafter "the instant disposition").

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 6, Eul evidence 1, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. Summary of the plaintiff's assertion

On January 5, 2006, the Plaintiff: Around 2006, when the Plaintiff installed the antenna on the vehicle, and was suffering from the wound of this case, but it did not have been opened at the hospital and completed training, and on February 5, 2006, the Plaintiff was able to receive medical treatment at the stage within the military unit. The Plaintiff did not receive medical treatment due to kne-related diseases before entering the military unit, and was also given normal judgment in the first physical examination before entering the military. The Plaintiff did not have a pipeed the symptoms of kne-free knee in the left-hand knee before the training of this case. After 2006, the Plaintiff received several medical treatment prior to the expiration of 20 years from July 25, 2006 until the expiration of 20 years from the military hospital, and the Plaintiff did not suffer any error in the record of 13 years from the date of entry into the military hospital.

B. Determination

1) Article 4(1)6 of the Act on the Honorable Treatment and Support of Persons, etc. of Distinguished Services to the State is insufficient to recognize “military police officers on duty” as “the primary cause for the performance of their duties or education and training, etc.” solely based on the fact that there is a proximate causal relation between the wounds of military personnel, etc., and the injury must be “the primary cause” in direct connection with the performance of their duties or education and training, which are directly related to the national defense, safety, or the protection of the lives and property of the people. Therefore, even if the performance of duties or education and training partly affected the wounds, where the performance of duties or education and training cannot be deemed as falling under the scope of the recognition of persons of distinguished services to the State, where it cannot be deemed as the primary cause for the occurrence of the difference, such as where the injury was mainly caused by his/her physical talent or living habits, or where the existing illness was partially aggravated due to the performance of duties or education and training (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2015Du4694, Jul. 27, 2017

2) According to the statements in Gap evidence Nos. 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, and 9 (including the number of branch numbers), the facts that the plaintiff was judged 'normal' in the part outside of the physical examination before enlistment, that the plaintiff did not have any data that the plaintiff had knee or knee disease treatment in school life, that the plaintiff was on Jan. 23, 2007, and that the plaintiff was injured at the left kne in the course of education and training on Feb. 5, 2006, on the part of the patient information investigation site of the same hospital on Jan. 23, 2007, it can be acknowledged that the plaintiff was stated as 'the fact that the plaintiff was knee in the part of the knee unit after training at the time of the mar on Jan. 23, 2006, and that the plaintiff was stated as 'the fact that the plaintiff was injured at the time of discharge'.

3) However, in light of the following circumstances, as a result of the request for the appraisal of the medical records for the evidence Nos. 9, 1, 2, and 3 and for the head of the D Hospital of this Court, it is insufficient to recognize that the difference in this case was directly or rapidly aggravated due to the difference suffered during the plaintiff's harsh training, and the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is insufficient to recognize that the difference in this case was caused or rapidly aggravated due to the difference occurring during the plaintiff's harsh training. Rather, the difference in this case cannot be ruled out to have been partially aggravated due to the training, etc. of this case. Accordingly, the plaintiff's above assertion cannot be accepted.

① It is unreasonable to interpret the above entry as ‘P-Hx' in the medical record of the private hospital (C Hospital) of the Plaintiff on December 13, 2006, and there is no reason to interpret the above entry as ‘N-Hx', and there is no reason to interpret the above entry differently. The above entry should be viewed as having no credit prior to the time of treatment as of December 13, 2006. Of the medical record of the National Armed Forces Chuncheon Hospital as of August 1, 2006, the above entry is written as ‘one year from the date of departure' in the medical record of the Plaintiff, and it is difficult to view that there was no reason to regard the above entry as a clerical error, and that there was no difference between the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff’s first time of training from August 1, 2005, and that there was no difference between the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff’s first time of training from the date of the entry as of August 1, 2005.

② The medical record in this case’s appraisal of the Plaintiff’s medical record reveals that the medical record in this case’s appraisal of the medical record in this case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case’s case.

③ In addition, according to the result of the fact-finding on the BJ medical service team of this court, the plaintiff was treated with pains on October 13, 2005, the plaintiff was treated with pains from 2 to 3 days, the plaintiff was treated with pains around December 29, 2005, the fact that the plaintiff was treated with pains around January 9, 2006, the fact that the plaintiff was treated with pains, and that he received treatment on March 7, 2006, and that the plaintiff was treated with wastewaters on March 7, 2006, because there was no difference between the plaintiff received treatment before and after around January 2006, it is difficult to view that the date and time of the occurrence of the plaintiff was proved.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.