[2] The case holding that, in a case where a worker who was discharged from his service with a transit bus after having completed an extended service and died due to the outbreak of a loss in the bus, the death of the deceased constitutes an occupational accident on the ground that his occupational course and stress overlap with an existing irregular beer, etc. and thus, the death of the deceased was presumed to constitute an occupational accident

1. Comprehensively taking account of the evidence adopted, the lower court determined that: (a) the deceased’s 1 was unable to engage in physical or mental work for 4 hours on the ground that the deceased’s 6th day of work and the deceased’s 20th day of work, and that the deceased’s 6th day of work was not his 6th day of work; (b) the deceased’s 4th day of work and the deceased’s 6th day of work on the ground that the deceased’s 6th day of work was not his 4th day of work; (c) the deceased’s 6th day of work on the ground that the deceased’s 6th day of work was not his 4th day of work; (d) the deceased’s 6th day of work on the ground that the deceased’s 6th day of work was not his her 4th day of work on the deceased’s 4th day of work on the day of their extension; and (d) the deceased’s 2th day of work on the day of the 4th day of work.

2. However, we cannot agree with the judgment of the court below for the following reasons.

The term “occupational accident” under Article 4 subparag. 1 of the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (amended by Act No. 8373 of Apr. 11, 2007) refers to a disease caused by a worker’s occupational injury during the performance of his/her duties. Thus, there should be a causal relationship between the disease caused by his/her occupational injury and death. However, if the main cause of the disease is not directly related to the performance of his/her duties, and at least the age or stress overlaps with the main cause of the disease, and caused or aggravated the disease, it should be deemed that there exists a causal relationship between his/her occupational injury and the disease. The causal relationship does not necessarily have to be proved clearly in medical and natural science, and if it is presumed that there is a proximate causal relationship between his/her occupational disease and the existing disease, which is likely to be ordinarily assigned to his/her occupational injury, and it should be determined differently by the empirical rule No. 978, Dec. 6, 2008 if it is difficult for the person to be declared as 980 years from the average disease and physical injury.

In light of the facts duly admitted by the court below and the following circumstances, i.e., (i) the deceased’s work performed in the non-party company: (ii) the deceased’s work performed by classifying the parts of the non-party company’s 80-year life and requesting the supply of the parts lacking to be timely supplied to the necessary operation team; (iii) it appears that the deceased’s work performed within the scope of 4 consecutive days because of stress or stress on the deceased’s work performed; and (iv) it is difficult for the deceased to sufficiently adapt to the deceased; (iii) the deceased’s work performed in the process of industrial accident investigation to make it difficult for new employees who are not skilled; and (iv) the deceased’s work performed within the scope of 120-day life with stress on the deceased’s health and stress; and (v) the deceased’s work performed within the scope of 20-day life-related mass mass mass accidents, which caused death.

Therefore, the court below's decision that the deceased's death does not constitute an occupational accident on its grounds as stated in its holding is erroneous in the misapprehension of the rules of evidence, or by misapprehending the legal principles on occupational accidents under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

3. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Hong-hoon (Presiding Justice)