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(영문) 대법원 1966. 12. 22. 선고 66다1908 전원합의체 판결

[부족도대금청구권확인][집14(3)민,353]

Main Issues

Effect of designation and public notice of planned land substitution and registration suspension

Summary of Judgment

In the urban district plan, the public announcement of the designation of the planned land substitution is not effective.

[Judgment of the Collegiate Body]

[Reference Provisions]

Article 40 of the Urban Planning Act, Article 129 of the Land Improvement Project Act

Reference Cases

Supreme Court Decision 66Da1085 Delivered on July 26, 1966

Plaintiff-Appellant

Yusung Hot Spring Co., Ltd. (Attorney Kim Tae-dong, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Defendant-Supplementary Intervenor in Defendant Bocheon-si

Defendant and the supplementary intervenor 1 et al. (Attorney Yang Sung-sik, Counsel for the supplementary intervenor)

Defendant-Appellee

Boan City

original decision

Seoul High Court Decision 65Na1726 delivered on August 25, 1966

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff.

Reasons

The first ground for appeal by the plaintiff's agent is examined.

However, even if the original adjudication, where the theory of land substitution is criticized, the registration passed through the name of the defendant 1 and others is enforced on May 22, 1961, and the Urban Planning Act enforced on January 20, 1962, the validity and invalidation of the above registration cannot be followed, and according to Articles 24(4) and 26 of the Decree on the Improvement of Land, which is applied mutatis mutandis by Article 43(2) of the Decree on the Improvement of Structure and Article 16 of the Rules on the Improvement of Land, Article 5 of the Enforcement Decree on the Improvement of Land, Article 6 of the Act on the Improvement of Land, which is effective on June 3, 1963, and Article 6 of the Rules on the Improvement of Land, Article 6 of the Act on the Improvement of Land, which is not effective only after the registration by the Do governor is made only after the designation by the land substitution is made, and thus the above decision of the court below on the suspension of the designation by Article 66 of the Act on the Improvement of Land, which is invalid.

The second ground of appeal is examined.

However, according to the records, the plaintiff's evidence No. 1 is recognized as the authenticity of the plaintiff's personal seal and the authenticity of the part of the plaintiff's personal seal. Thus, the court below's presumption of the authenticity of the document should be justified. The court below's rejection of the testimony of the non-party No. 1 and the non-party No. 2 by its free trial evidence is not recognized as erroneous. According to the records, the testimony of the non-party No. 3 of the court of first instance cannot be acknowledged as a document which has been partially forged like the theory of lawsuit. Thus, the court below's rejection of evidence No. 1 or it can be acknowledged on the premise of the independent value judgment of evidence or circumstance. On the premise of the independent value judgment of evidence or circumstance, it can be acknowledged that the court below's rejection of the evidence No. 1 and the non-party No. 1 et al. are groundless, and considering the records, it cannot be viewed that the defendant No. 2 was a s. 1 omitted.

The third ground of appeal is examined.

However, under the premise that the court below can evaluate evidence differently from this part of this case, Eul evidence 2 cannot be admitted to the argument that the defendant et al.'s agent is not a receipt for the purchase price of this case, and there is only the fact that the non-party 4 voluntarily entered the part of the statement other than the "Yancheon Transfer Check" other than the "Yancheon Transfer Check Price Article". The document is not an inevitable reason that the document should be viewed as a receipt for ( Address 1 omitted) and ( Address 2 omitted). It is clear that the court below is not a purpose of finding the facts by finding the facts by taking the above after the fact-finding, and considering the fifth pleading protocol of the court of first instance, it is not clear that the defendant et al.'s agent stated Eul evidence 2 as the receipt for the purchase price of this case ( Address 1 omitted), and it is not a receipt for the purchase price of this case, but it is clear that it is a receipt for the total amount of the above land and it is not a receipt for the non-party 4.

The ground of appeal No. 4 is examined.

However, this case's land is not a name that will be incorporated into the road in the future, but it has already been a road in reality from August 24, 1955, and it cannot be deemed that the fact-finding of the court below which recognized the sale of the land in this case is erroneous. In full view of each evidence cited by the court below, since it can be recognized that the land in this case was purchased from the plaintiff in the defendant's side due to the same circumstance as the original decision, it can not be discussed to criticize the fact-finding of the court below on the premise of independent valuation of evidence or circumstances.

It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges in accordance with the above reasons and the principle of the cost of lawsuit failure.

Justices of the Supreme Court (Presiding Judge) Dog-Gyeong (Presiding Judge) Dog-Gyeong-Gyeong, Kim-dong, Kim & Kim, Kim Hong-kak, Kim Ho-man, the Mag-man, the maximum lubbbb