손해배상(기)
1. All appeals by the plaintiffs and the defendant are dismissed.
2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by each party.
purport, purport, and.
1. The reasoning of the court's explanation concerning this case is as follows, and this case is cited in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act, since the court's explanation is the same as the judgment of the first instance except for partial revision as follows.
o Part 3 of the Judgment of the first instance court, " August 4, 1982, 1982" was amended to " August 4, 1986," and part 4, " May 26, 1987," respectively, to " May 28, 1987," respectively.
o The fourth 20th 20th 1st 20th 1st 20th 20th 20th 20th 20th 1st 3th 3th 3th 3th 3th 3th 4th 4th 1987.
o Part 5 of the Judgment of the first instance court (Seoul High Court 87No853, hereinafter referred to as the “the Judgment subject to the review of this case”) shall be subject to the 10th judgment "Seoul High Court 87No853, hereinafter referred to as the “Decision”)".
o Part 7 through 9 of the 8th trial of first instance shall be added to the following contents:
A person shall be appointed.
B. 1) The gist of the Defendant’s defense of extinctive prescription expired since 1986, which was the date of tort, 5 years after the lapse of 1986. Even if there was an objective obstacle that the Plaintiffs could not exercise their right to claim damages, since from 2010, they should be deemed that such obstacle was resolved, the instant lawsuit was subsequently filed within six months, but the instant lawsuit was subsequently filed. 2) Since the exercise of the right to claim defense based on the obligor’s extinctive prescription is governed by the Civil Act, the principle of good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights, which are the major principle of the Civil Act, and thus, the obligor’s assertion for the completion of extinctive prescription cannot be allowed as an abuse of rights against the good faith principle if there are special circumstances where it is impossible to expect the exercise of rights due to a de facto obstacle that could not exercise rights objectively before the expiration of prescription (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 93Da27604, Dec. 9, 1994).