도로교통법위반(음주운전)
The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.
1. In full view of the evidence presented by the prosecutor in the grounds for appeal, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles or misconception of facts, even though the defendant could sufficiently recognize the facts of drinking alcohol.
2. Determination:
A. The Defendant consistently driven the Defendant’s C Freight (hereinafter “instant vehicle”) from an investigative agency to this court, and set up two lanes, and left the Defendant at the instant vehicle without being subject to the principle of no taxation and taxation. The Defendant merely denied the charges by asserting that the Defendant had not driven the instant vehicle.
B. In a case where the statement made by a person other than the defendant on the trial date contains the statement of the defendant, when the statement made by the defendant was made under particularly reliable circumstances pursuant to Article 316(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, it may be admitted as evidence. The protocol containing the hearsay statement shall be admitted as evidence in accordance with Articles 312 through 314 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and the protocol containing such hearsay statement shall be admissible as evidence only when it satisfies the above conditions under Article 316(1) of the Criminal Procedure
(1) Article 312(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that “A police officer who arrests the Defendant shall have the right to be present at the time of arrest or investigation of the police officer at the time of the arrest or investigation of the said police officer” (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 99Do4814, Sept. 8, 2000; 2001Do3106, Oct. 9, 2001; 2004Do482, Apr. 27, 2004).”
(See Supreme Court Decisions 83Do3223, 83Do538 delivered on February 28, 1984, and Supreme Court Decision 2005Do5831 delivered on November 25, 2005, etc.
In this case, the defendant.